## MAX-SI

RESET IV: Going Rogue with Real Estate: Doubling Capacity \& Accelerated Expansion, 1996-2013E


|  | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2009-11 | 2007-09 | 2005-06 | 2002-04 | 2001 | 1997-00 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Net Store Growth-US | 3.0\% | 2.4\% | 2.2\% | 0.79\% | -0.47\% | 0.35\% | 1.22\% | 0.80\% | 0.96\% | 2.2\% | 3.2\% | 2.9\% | 5.1\% |
| Gross Openings | 6.0\% | 5.7\% | 5.3\% | 4.3\% | 3.26\% | 2.86\% | 2.90\% | 3.01\% | 4.2\% | 5.5\% | 6.3\% | 7.0\% | 9.8\% |
| Gross Closings | 3.0\% | 3.3\% | 3.1\% | 3.5\% | 3.9\% | 2.53\% | 1.69\% | 2.71\% | 3.3\% | 3.0\% | 3.7\% | 4.1\% | 4.5\% |
| NetStore Global | 5.8\% | 6.2\% | 4.8\% | 4.6\% | 2.20\% | 3.33\% | 3.36\% | 3.10\% | 3.9\% | 6.0\% | 5.7\% | 6.7\% | 8.7\% |
| Comp Sales Index | 2.9\% | 2.7\% | 0.3\% | -2.7\% | -1.00\% | 2.93\% | 2.83\% | 1.61\% | -1.0\% | 2.8\% | 2.7\% | 2.5\% | 4.5\% |
| Shopping Ctr Index | 3.1\% | 2.9\% | 0.7\% | -2.7\% | -0.92\% | 2.78\% | 2.98\% | 1.67\% | -1.2\% | 3.0\% | 2.9\% | 2.7\% | 4.3\% |
| Global Comp Sales | 4.0\% | 5.5\% | 5.8\% | 0.8\% | 0.74\% | 2.26\% | 2.39\% | 2.35\% | 1.7\% | 4.8\% | 4.6\% | 3.6\% | 6.6\% |
| Real GDP Growth | 3.1\% | 2.7\% | 1.9\% | 0.3\% | -3.5\% | 3.0\% | 3.00\% | 1.93\% | -0.2\% | 2.6\% | 2.9\% | 1.1\% | 4.5\% |

RESET IV: Going Rogue with Real Estate. New Store Strategies Doubling Capacity \& Double-Digit Growth
2011 is turning out to be a positive inflection point for retail real estate. The seven-year attrition in new supply appears to have run its course. It's time to ramp up and move growth into fourth gear after idling during most of the recession. The new store pipeline in 2011 increased by $11 \%$, which is a significant break from the $10 \%$ annual retrenchment in new capacity that has been occurring since 2004. Over the next two years, new capacity for the Total Channel Index will expand at a run rate of $4 \%$, surpassing forecasts for consumption and economy by 100-200 bps. In the yearend issue, MAX-SI will highlight the trends that have turned retailers rogue on real estate. A preliminary road map for the next store cycle has been provided in the supply tables under OPENINGS, AC-DC section depicting chains accelerating and doubling capacity, innovation of new growth vehicles in NEXT! and sales of formats comping at higher levels due to the new baseline of value created by rationalization, remodels and re-branding.

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## Pipeline Pulse: Supply-Demand Analytics

Emerging Trends 2012+

## Going Rogue with Real Estate <br> Double-Digit Growth in the Digital Age

2011 is turning out to be a positive inflection point for retail real estate. The seven-year attrition in new supply appears to have run its course. It's time to ramp up and move growth into fourth gear after idling during most of the recession. The new store pipeline in 2011 increased by $11 \%$, which is a significant break from the $10 \%$ annual retrenchment in new capacity that has been occurring since 2004. Over the next two years, new capacity for the Total Channel Index will expand at a run rate of $4 \%$, surpassing forecasts for consumption and economy by 100-200 bps. (See graph below. For detail by sector \& format, see Total Channel Index-Gross Openings on pp. 22-35 and ACDC tables on pp. 59-63.)

Store Pipelines Go Rogue 2011-13E
Gross Openings: Levels vs. Annual Change in Pipeline Size, 1995


But many retailers are unwilling to settle for low single-digit growth at this stage of the profit cycle. Top ranked chains and formats on MAXIM's Global 400 Retail Watch List and restructuring credits have recovered from the recession in 2010 only to hit a wall in 2011 as operating metrics and store sales slacken due to setbacks in the economy. For these operators, the New Normal is not sub par growth that will continue to border on paranormal growth of deleveraging that is expected to play out for the next 10-15 years. ${ }^{1}$

The existing supply ballast over weighted with under performing stores requires greater operating leverage that can only be realized through growth greater than $\underline{\underline{2 \%} \text { (an issue addressed in Q3 2011). Extensive store models now underway as }}$ cap ex budgets are increased for the second consecutive year will restore productivity for only a portion of existing supply. By doubling existing capacity over the next 5-8 years, retailers can produce a younger vintage of higher producing stock while generating double-digit growth reminiscent of the golden age of chain store expansion during the 1980s and 1990s.

In the yearend issue, MAX-SI will highlight the trends that have turned retailers rogue on real estate. A preliminary road map for the next store cycle has been provided in the supply tables under OPENINGS, AC-DC section depicting chains accelerating and doubling capacity, innovation of new growth vehicles in NEXT! and sales of formats comping at higher levels due to the new baseline of value created by rationalization, remodels and re-branding.

Going rogue with real estate has yielded strategies that break with the "measured growth" of the past seven years that underscored the protracted cycle of real estate rationalization and conventional store formats and locations. Not only is the function of the store changing (a trend reported by NEXT! the past two quarters) as retailers

In this context, the findings of the Openings and Closings pipeline tables will be viewed through the prism of five trends defining the spatial markets at this stage of the new store cycle:

1. "Going Rogue"-accelerated store expansion \& doubling of capacity
2. "Downward Mobility" New Normal that accounts for the new "middle class" or those households whose earnings and purchasing power...
3. "Down Market" ${ }^{2}$...
4. "Re-Branding" $\cdots \cdots$.
5. "Right-Sizing" ...

Text continues....

[^0]Catalysts Driving the New Store Cycle:
The New Bet on US Retail

Other catalysts driving the renewed expansion in store supply cited in previous 2011 issues include:

- Eroding productivity due overweighting of store portfolios by nonproductive assets (as much as $85 \%$ as reported by Retail MAXIM 2011 store survey) demands a younger vintage base to grow portfolio sales per square foot for greater leverage
- Myriad of EMPOWERING New Normals flagged by Retail MAXIM in 2011 that are catalysts in redefining the supply-demand dynamic of the US marketplace. ${ }^{3}$
- Defensive measures as the competitive playing shifts with new players that are US-based and foreign and online incursion takes share of commodity and discretionary goods
- Upsizing store campaigns after 5-8 years of downsizing portfolios to create a stronger core of productive assets
- Disappointing E-commerce Holiday in 2011 reemphasized the critical role that bricks \& mortars still plays in US shopping landscape
- Changing the function of the conventional store format that has been chartering new ground since the recession got underway.
- Burgeoning "tourist economy" under globalization requires flagships and brand equity stores to connect with the peripatetic middle class in the West and East
- Euro crisis renews focus on relative stability and growth prospects in eh US attracting a growing number of new foreign brands and retailers looking to grab a piece of the US mass market (as growth is driven by off price and cheap chic concepts not luxury)
- $\quad$ Shifting focus from China to US as manufacturer brands and fashion chains fail to generate growth and high four-wall returns on heavy capital investment the past 5-10 years. Fast food has done well in China but not fashion or durables (Home Depot \& Ikea). China's economy has been slowing. The government is focused on building its retail industry as it shifts from an export to domestic consumption model
- Capitalize on ongoing sector and economic dislocations around the country as well as under served markets where there are retailing gaps (including the absence of giants like Walmart)

Text continues....

[^1] diagrammed the new retail landscape.

Pipeline Pulse: Supply-Demand Analytics
OPENINGS \& CLOSINGS Pipeline Trends

## OPENINGS

2011 Real Estate Inflection Point
Five Strategies Driving a New Capacity \& Accelerated Expansion
If 2011 was truly an inflection point, then it may be time to view supply trends in a new context under what could be new norms. Supply pipelines in 2011 remained $50 \%$ below the normative size of the past two decades where new store capacity averaged 24,000 units annually. The run rate for 2009-2012 will average 13,000 units. Even as retailers go rogue by upping capacity, the pipeline will remain well below the past several decades. 13-K new units annually are the new norm. MAX-SI views the "relative" lower levels of supply as a net positive and part of the grand RESET scheme in retail that it has been reporting on since the 2008 financial meltdown. Expansion is measured which is not limited to low growth or no growth but focused growth, targeting markets where capacity cane be ramped or convergence lends to greater four-wall maximization.

The value created has yet to fully manifest in existing supply as internal growth (comp sales) remains uneven as evidenced by the setbacks experienced in the second half of 2011 after the 2010 resurgence. (See "Sales Pulse" on pp. 100115). That said, the four-wall productivity data is showing increases for those retailers that have the recession if not the past decade rationalizing their real estate by way of repositioning, remodels, relocations and closings of under performing stock and assets that are no longer integral to the operating model The exercise has born fruit, providing a new road map for store expansion capable of leveraging and monetizing the asset value created. At this stage however, the real estate landscape remains fluid to the point of being borderless given the variability of spatial requirements of the 600+ chains on the MAX-SI Spatial Index supporting over 1,800 various formats. The conventional view that retailers are I

Continues....
To frame the growing complexities of the emerging store cycle, MAX-SI has identified five real estate strategies gleamed from retailers' earnings calls and press releases that seek to capitalize on the shifting landscape under the many New Normals discussed in MAX-SI Q3 2011 that will impact supply-demand dynamics. At this stage, the macro tables mask much of the changes occurring at the format level and within the four-walls. For greater granularity, the catalog of new format specs and growth objectives continue to be flagged by NEXT! and comp sales tables in Sales Pulse. (See Openings tables on pp. 22-42 for levels, growth rates, share of pipelines and square footage trends.)

## \#1: Going Rogue: Accelerating Store Expansion/ Inflating Future Supportable

 Capacity- To transcend an economy that remains hostile to the consumer and mired in sub par growth under the grip of protracted develeraging, supply pipelines and future capacity were dramatically inflated in 2011 at rates not seen in two decades.
- 2011 gross store pipeline for the Total Channel Index increased in size by $11.5 \%$ over 2010 levels as retailers upped the ante on new capacity and accelerated roll out to manufacture growth absent in a beleaguered economy. Gross additions in 2011 expanded total supply for the Index by $2.9 \%$, a significant advance after three years of net negative growth to the collapse in new supply and rise in closings.
- Formats going rogue are understated by sector level growth. That said, sectors that are significantly increasing capacity at multiples of 1.40-2.40 times off base supply of 2007. The diversity of sectors and channels provides a snapshot of

Text continues...

## CLOSINGS

The New Logic of Real Estate Rationalization.
Attrition in Pipeline of Closings
The Total Channel Index closed 7,400 stores in 2011, a sharp decline from 2010 of $35 \%$, and $56 \%$ of the three-year annual run rate during the 2007-10 Recession-Recovery. In 2012, closings are expected to drop by another 12\% to approximately 6,500 units. In terms of percentage of total supply tracked by the MAX-SI Spatial Index, the rate of closings in 2011 was 1.69\%, well below the four-year run rate of $3.15 \%$. Much of the stock liquidated in 2011 was concentrated in older formats that have long matured or grown irrelevant opened in the 1980s and 1990s (50\% of supply built). Retailers have been steadily eliminating such assets are no longer integral to evolving merchandising platforms and shifting competitive landscape, or where productivity is too low to be profitable or cover occupancy costs. Underpinning the reduction of stock is the process of value creation as seen in the levels of Non-Competitive Supply being closed, that in 2011 accounted for $70 \%$ of total supply. While this was high, it is below the run rate of the past decade of $85 \%$. The share of Competitive supply liquidating increased to $29 \%$, versus the run rte of $15 \%$.

Contributing to increase was New Concepts developed since 2002 that are no longer sustainable where closings were $13 \%$ of the Total Index in 2011. The liquidation is concentrated in fashion apparel that is the most speculative retail category that lends to a high fatality rate. In 2012, the rouging of innovated supply will drop by $50 \%$ accompanied by a surge in new formats. As stated in the analysis of supply pipeline trends, retailers are still trying to find the right capacity in the myriad of New Normals altering the spatial markets.

Other Sector Trends
Mall-based closings still account for one-third of the closing pipeline, which is slightly lower than the 40-50\% levels of the past two decades. Inline shops and dept store anchors closed more supply than opened in 2011, a trend that will continue in 2012 as many chains seek to right-size portfolios. Not only will underperformers be liquidated by relocations will result in small formats; leaving a residual of dark space that may remain hidden in vacancy metrics.
The impact of the New Normal of Downward Mobility (MAX-SI Q3 2011) has continued to marginalize supply supporting lower middle class household (incomes \$25-\$49-K). In 2011, share of closings accounted for $54 \%$ of total stock liquidated which will trend lower in 2011 to $44 \%$ as levels of closings shift higher for working class (<\$25-K) and Upper middle class (>\$50-K).

Liquidation cycles are as variable as store stock supporting the $36+$ sub sectors on the MAX-SI Spatial Index. Downsizing is a dance between High Churning and Low Churning supply. The churns in 2011 are diagrammed below.
High Churning sectors where share of total closing pipelines is greater than 5\% (typically a liquidation rate) include:

- Moderate-price point retail formats
- Lower middle class formats ( $\$ 25$ to $49-\mathrm{K}$ household incomes)
- Upper middle class formats (\$49-\$75-K household incomes)
- National retailers
- Mall-based retail (soft goods and hard line durable goods)
- Lifestyle retail (mall \& strips)
- Foreign brands (aggregate of al categories-fashion, décor, category killers, food, dining)
- Accessories: Jewelry (mall-based)
- Shoes: Athletic
- Shoes: Malls and strips
- Books superstores
- Video stores
- Theaters-screens


## AC-DC: Accelerating-Decelerating Pipelines

## GOING ROGUE POST 2010 INFLECTION POINT

330 Chains Accelerating Store Expansion 2011-12
The attrition in net supply appeared to have bottomed in 2011. Based on preliminary store openings and closings for 2012, net expansion shows a slight up tick, the first in over five years. As noted in the summary of pipeline trends in1-19 and NEXT!, the new aggression being displayed has upped the ante on the level of openings in 2011 and future capacity deemed supportable long term that is 2-2 times current store base.

In 2011, MAX-SI identified 330 formats (with store base greater than 49 units) that have already re-accelerated expansion where the combined 2011-12 pipelines are greater than the recessionary period of 2007-10 and in some cases above the annual average of the 2003-06 shopping center bubble. The accelerated pipeline has the potential to deliver 1.75 the stores opened between 2007 and 20110 and 1.30 times the annual supply added between 2003 and 2006. This equates to 10,000 new units off an existing store base of 292,700, an increase of $3.4 \%$ which is greater than the MAX-SI Total Channel Index of $2.3 \%$.

The following characteristics of the new store pipeline support the many of the new trends redefining retail real estate as discussed in the Pipeline Summary NEXT! and Q3 2011 issue of MAX-SI.

- Distribution of new supply by size of existing chain: Chains supporting 4599 stores ( $40 \%$ of the total 330 chains) are leading the resurgence in new supply expansion followed by chains with portfolios of 200-500 units (36\%) and chains operating 500+ units (24\%). Takeaway: Large portfolios have yet to max out and have identified new markets and locations that are underserved, vacated by weaker retailers that possess higher productivity potential and willingness to saturate existing markets to play a zero-sum game.
- Share of supply by anchor vs. inline spec space: Anchor formats (big boxes) account for $40 \%$ of 2011-12 pipelines vs. $60 \%$ of in-line or smalle format that typically occupy multi-lease space at malls and strip centers. Takeaway: The ratio of anchors to inline remains consistent with past store cycles in part because anchor-type boxes are freestanding formats for urban development that continues to dominate over suburban if not the new tenants at malls with dark dept store pads and gaping inline spaces The smaller inline formats is driven by the right-sizing of existing mall and power center category killers and the ongoing penetration of infil markets started back during the 1997-98 dotcom bubble when the Last Mile was the Holy Grail but now the tableau of m-commerce.
- Distribution by price point: Value formats accelerating supply accounted or $33 \%$ of the 330 chains flagged versus full price that represented $60 \%$ of the total 10,000 units planned to open and luxury or premium price formats at $10 \%$. Takeaway: The shift to full price is a break with past seven years of rolling out the full spectrum of value formats as retailers trade up to grab share of a consumer with greater incomes and purchasing power. The trend was discussed in the NEXT! section on pp. 64-69 many new formats in 2011 were designed around a full price experience. The accelerating pipeline of 330 chains reflects the growth of ...

Text continues....

|  | Base |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Pipeli } \\ \text { ne } \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 2011 \\ & \text { Base } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Store | 2012E | $\begin{array}{\|c} 2011- \\ 2012 \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 2011- } \\ 2012 \end{gathered}$ | Annu al Avg. |  |  | Index ed |
|  | Suppl | vs. | vs. | vs. | Open |  |  | to |
|  | 2011 | 2011 | $\begin{aligned} & 2007 \\ & 2010 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2003- \\ & 2006 \end{aligned}$ | 2012E | 2011 | $\begin{aligned} & 2007- \\ & 2010 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2007 \\ & \text { Base } \end{aligned}$ |
| Starbucks: Licensed Stores | 4,464 | 5.25 | 0.87 | 0.46 | 210 | 40 | 288 | 3.92 |
| Pier One | 972 | 5.00 | 57.60 | 1.44 | 60 | 12 | 1 | 0.88 |
| Chicos | 602 | 5.00 | 1.80 | 0.75 | 30 | 6 | 20 | 1.72 |
| Finish Line | 702 | 3.50 | 3.60 | 0.56 | 28 | 8 | 10 | 1.37 |
| Starbucks (US) | 6,742 | 3.00 | 0.59 | 0.28 | 150 | 50 | 337 | 2.05 |
| Wendy's (coowned) | 1,408 | 2.50 | 1.12 | 0.76 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 0.90 |
| Wingstop | 617 | 2.50 | 4.00 | 1.87 | 50 | 20 | 18 | 1.52 |
| Gamestop | 4,366 | 2.20 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 22 | 10 | 257 | 3.55 |
| Target | 1,491 | 2.00 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 4 | 2 | 57 | 1.42 |
| CHS: Lane Bryant | 687 | 2.00 | 0.38 | 0.20 | 8 | 4 | 32 | 1.17 |
| Cracker Barrel | 601 | 2.00 | 1.53 | 0.67 | 12 | 6 | 12 | 1.32 |
| Sports Champ (Footlocker) | 529 | 2.00 | 1.04 | 0.45 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 0.91 |
| Ross Dress | 1,012 | 1.92 | 1.26 | 1.10 | 50 | 26 | 60 | 2.04 |
| Party City ( | 508 | 1.88 | 6.57 | 1.92 | 15 | 8 | 4 | 1.04 |
| Regal Cinema | 534 | 1.70 | 1.59 | 0.92 | 17 | 10 | 17 | 1.02 |
| Bennetton Group | 685 | 1.67 | 4.57 | 3.05 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 1.00 |
| Edible Arrangements | 934 | 1.59 | 6.85 | 5.56 | 350 | 220 | 83 | 17.62 |
| Victoria Secrets | 1,016 | 1.50 | 1.21 | 1.27 | 12 | 8 | 17 | 0.84 |
| Auntie Anne's ( | 800 | 1.50 | 2.16 | 0.53 | 12 | 8 | 9 | 1.29 |
| Bob Evans | 571 | 1.50 | 2.35 | 0.46 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 1.14 |
| Seattle's Best | 530 | 1.50 | 0.40 | 0.31 | 15 | 10 | 63 | 2.41 |
| Family Dollar | 7,019 | 1.43 | 3.76 | 1.84 | 500 | 350 | 226 | 1.52 |
| JBX: Qdoba | 628 | 1.43 | 2.39 | 2.58 | 100 | 70 | 71 | 8.16 |

NEXT!
Format Innovation of New Concepts

## 2011 in Review:

Going Rogue with New Concept Roll Outs

If 2010 was an inflection point for growth and operating metrics, the slack that consumed all grades of retailers in 2011 did not detract from the ongoing advances being made on the real estate front. The focus on reinventing and adapting the conventional store model to the emerging marketplace has never been greater and expansion plans reminiscent of the aggression displayed by Walmart a decade ago By the looks of things, retailers are going rogue with their real estate.

Not only is the "function" of the store changing but its redesign has upped the ante on future supportable capacity, defying the conventional wisdom that America is over-stored and diminished growth prospects wrought by the New Economic Normal of Downward Mobility. Armed with a new blueprint that will leverage the shifting landscape, retailers feel emboldened that the adaptation of the conventional store backed by new capacity will keep the channel central to the shopping experience. So much so that pipelines for 2012-13 have been increased after four years of steady retrenchment not only for existing core store assets but new formats that consist of pilots. Growth expected to be sustainable as future supportable capacities have been doubled during second half of 2011.

The yearend review of format innovation captures the developments that stand to restore the primacy of the store with shoppers in search of a more dynamic experience than the rote click of virtual shopping carts and checkouts. The bigger story that emerged in 2011 turned out to be the retailer's real estate not Web sites, online daily deals or social media apps. One that will carry over to

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## Measured Aggression: The Rationale for Doubling Capacity

After years of endless experimentation and highly measured growth, retailers are ready to roll out formats they are confident will advance the experience and yield greater productivity. Cap ex budgets were increased in 2012 for the second year after holding back the past five years. Consequently, the rate of expansion has been stepped up along with capacity. The inflection in net supply is captured in the Supply \& Demand tables on pp. 20-21.

- Aggressive expansion not seen in nearly a decade as pipelines of new formats were inflates upping the ante on initial roll out and supportable capacity or total build-out over the current decade that would double store portfolios
- Higher initial roll outs in the new 2011-12 pipeline is a break with the highly conservative growth of the past five years. For the 100 freestanding formats conceived in 2011 2,500 stores are planned to open by 2013, or 25 per concept In contrast to 2010, 2,000 stores or 14 per each of the 145 concepts announced were planned for rollout in 2011-12.
- Doubling of future store capacity by national and regional chains that have been experimenting with new formats during the recession with an eye toward markets (geographic) where dislocations will likely prove greatest going forward that would support new formats capable of taking share. The trend is universal w/ big chains TJX, Target, K
- Start-ups and regional chains have accelerated their national roll out in the short-term while quadrupling potential store capacity. (Tilley's, Simply Fashion, Five Below, Charming Charlie)
- Global retailers entering the US with "notable" New Concepts accounted for 18 chains compared to 27 in 2010. US retailers have spent the past four years restructuring and repositioning that has manifested in a new platform for growth and greater confidence to go about against the foreign competitive incursion
- Average store size in 2011 was 13,000 sq ft versus 20,000 in 2010 and $22,000 \mathrm{sq} \mathrm{ft}$ in 2009. The reduced footprint can be attributed to the resurgence in mall concepts in apparel, accessories, shoes and HBA ( $48 \%$ of new supply) that is also impacted by downsizing of typical mall stores and convergence on the Omni-Channel platform.
- Developing formats that are "opportunistic expansion vehicles" and capable of exploiting sector and economic weakness with the muchexpected ongoing shakeout and consolidation of the US retail industry. Format specifications range from smaller prototypes to bigger "interactive" boxes (led by the revival of the CONCEPT Store and expansion of Epicenter model as outlined in Q3 2011 issue).
- National chains are allocating more capital into new concepts much like the late 1990s when structural changes alter supply-demand dynamics. In 2011, many nationals supported 2-3 new concepts

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## SALES PULSE: Same-Store Sales Trends

The Relativity of Comp Growth in an Uneven Recovery
2010 Inflection Point for Internal Growth? Or is 2.5\% the New Normal?
The recovery appears to be underway for retail if internal growth is any measure. Comp sales for MAX-SI's Total Channel Index generated positive growth above $2.5 \%$ for the second consecutive year, driving a wedge between the negative growth that had gripped the sector over the arc of the recession in an economy that could not find a bottom. But the fact is internal growth appeared to hit an inflection point in 2010 where growth slowed, at risk of regressing back to unprofitable levels.

The Total Channel Index grew by a profitable rate of $2.83 \%$ yet failed to surpass 2010 gains of $2.93 \%$. Mall-based retailers grew by a profitable $4.65 \%$ in 2011, but failed to sustain the momentum of 2010 in losing 23 bps . The new tenant base at the mall consisting of foreign retailers and specialty concepts of manufactured brands, two segments that not only grew between 5 and $10 \%$ in 2011 but outpaced gains in 2010 by as much as 350 bps, could not offset the ongoing weakness in inline shops, much of which remains rooted in women's and teen apparel. (See Sector Comp Sales tables on pp. 100-104.) Even the first true "E-Holiday" disappointed. Store formats of chains converging on the omni-channel platform did not fare much better. Omni-sales comps grew by $6.00 \%$ short of 2010 by 23 bps as sales of both e-commerce and store-based retail declined by 417 bps and 129 bps, respectively.

In contrast, strip retail (grocery-anchored neighborhood centers) grew by 1.98\%, levels deemed profitable for food and drug store formats operating with lower occupancy costs, and managed to transcend the lull of 2010 by 95 bps despite inflationary pressures in groceries and ongoing oppressive regulatory changes in the health care sector that impacts drug retailers as much as supermarkets. While the masses may be budgeting and spending along the lower rung of Maslow's Hierarchical needs of survival, food and drug retailers are ahead of, say, dept stores in adapting the shopping experience to the new consumer.

What the channel trends reveal is that performance remains as uneven as the strength of the economic recovery remains uncertain. For example, of the 226 individual formats that posted gains greater than 200 bps between 2009 and 2010 only 53 sustained the same level of growth during fiscal 2011. Within this pool of advancing formats, 96 achieved growth over 900 bps between 2009 and 2009 whereas only 10 formats advanced by a similar magnitude (mainly fashion brands of VFC that are being embraced as the new lifestyle formats). In 2011, 51 formats from the same pool of 266 experienced slower growth that bordered on flat whereas 118 formats posted sharp declines in comp growth of greater than 200 bps , joining the 44 flat growth formats in 2010 that succumb to negative growth in 2011. Suffice to say, achieving terra firma remains tricky.

The uneven performance in internal growth is not limited to one sector or channe given that structural changes in the industry have impacted every format just as the secular dislocations in the economy that continue to destroy wealth and standard of living for the bottom 99\% is now taking from the top 1\%. Be it the past thirty years of policies hostile to the lower \& middle classes seeking upward mobility or egregious aftermath of the 2008 collapse of the financial sector that is hyper-concentrating riches into a more finite pool of $0.1 \%$ of the infamous $1 \%$, the American consumer is under siege.

Continues....
What to Expect 2012:
Finding the New Growth Normal
Retailers guidance for fiscal 2012 puts comp growth for the Total Channel Index in a range of $1.0 \%$ to $3.0 \%$, or an average of $2.0 \%$. This will be the first year that retailers are forecasting "relatively" greater upside as negative growth has been reduced a small pool of formats unlike 2009-2010 when the broad sector was factoring in a potential down leg. Based on patterns of Shopping-On-Demand that bunches consumer expenditures by the seasonal calendar quarterly sales in Q1 and Q4 could post growth in the higher range, above 3\%. The inability to break out of the New Normal of $2.0 \%$ is attributed to the short and long-term pressure points highlighted below.

- Short-term pressure points on internal growth:


## Economic Front

- Recovery in retail \& economy is still tepid and uneven. Breaking free from the past two-years of destructive recovery (ongoing massive job layoffs and falling housing prices) is unlikely given the absence of a economic policies with fixes
o Fear of "false economic spring" in job markets as industries continue to layoff at rates above or equal to hiring
- Economic growth is occurring against a background of speculative global monetary policy where the world's financial system is broken
- Trickle down effects of Wall Street dislocation with ongoing..
- Ongoing decline in construction jobs due protracted housing

Continues...

## How the Top 1\% and Bottom 99\% Are Saving the Muddled Middle Market

Taking a contrarian stance to the dire outlooks issued by global retail consultants and real estate brokerage firms, MAX-SI sees upside in the middle market that supports America's mainstay of full price and branded retail formats. The "rebranding" trend discussed in MAX-SI Q3 2001 and Retail MAXIM Nov 2011, is a key catalyst in generating upside in four-wall comp growth. As the comp tables on pp. 100-115 reveal, sales trends the past two years have been compelling for retail concepts of manufactured brands, affordable luxury that is expanding with a bevy of new concepts, the reinvention of lifestyle formats and dept stores, the ongoing evolution of conventional supermarkets that includes many private sector companies that do not report comps but provide new standards to be appropriated and a host of new full price formats flagged in NEXT!

These sectors have been posting comp growth of $5 \%$ to $30 \%$. In the fashion and sportswear sector, some have comped as high as $50-85 \%$ that is no doubt shortlived but reveals a pent-up demand for branded goods even if consumers are budget constrained. Formats that have been adapting their businesses to the new landscape since 2004 such as supermarkets and wholesale clubs (that sell national brands) have posted consistent comps above $4 \%$. Whereas brands that have reinvented since the 2007 recession and 2008 financial collapse are reporting double digit increase such as Nike, Quicksilver and VFC's stable of outdoor concepts. Many have beat out luxury format comps by a multiple of 2-4 times, which puts more pressure on luxury already being impacted by the global slowdown to reinvent the platform as it had to do in the 1990s and 2002-07 bubble. (See discussion on luxury and new challenges in next section on comp sales trends.)

Continues....
How the Top 1\% and Bottom 99\% Are Saving the Muddled Middle Market
Finding the Ground in Long Tails of Luxury and Extreme Value
Better to Embrace Manufactured Brands Than Manufactured Misperceptions of Luxury \& Extreme Value

Managing expectations is about alerting investors of potential risks whereas manufacturing misperceptions is about masking the weakness and downside that could result in unlimited losses. The latter has become the tool of the retail and real estate pundits whose short-term memory has eclipsed the structural forces that caused an unprecedented dislocation in the broad retail sector. First and foremost, the 2007 recession was one of many firsts that has had an interminable lasting impact on every retail sector. The first Rich Man's recession where wealth destruction was took out the $1 \%$ as well the $99 \%$. The first global recession where Europe and parts of Asia went into the same economic/ financial tail spin as the US.

## Continues....

## Sector Level Relative Performance: Gains, Erosions, Chronic Losses

In a recovery that remains uneven, looking at comp sales on a relative basis may provide some direction since retailers have formulated cohesive strategies that compensate for the lack of a national economic policy that would restore an upwardly mobile society. The greatest advances and declines in 2011 relative to 2010 are flagged in the comp tables. Sectors likely to advance and post steady growth versus those that will be challenged are highlighted below.

Some of the riskier formats that are opening stores while comp sales bleed have become the desired tenants of landlords. Other formats posting competitive comp growth but experienced sales erosion in 2011 are rethinking spatial requirements that could translate into slower expansion or lower lease renewals.

Moderate-High Growth 2011 (6-30\%)/Relative Mod-High Advances 2010-11

- Manufactured-brands-retail concepts (mall \& freestanding urban)
- Foreign-owned brands (apparel, HBA/jewelry)
- Upscale dept stores
- Apparel-men's specialty (mall and strip)
- HBA/cosmetic formats: urban \& rural/prestige \& mass class
- Accessories-Lingerie-mall formats
- New Concepts (rolled out since 2005)
- Cheap Chic (US \& foreign chains)
. Warehouse clubs
- Supermarkets-Premium/Specialty/Organic
- Restaurant chains: Fast food (all segments led by coffee/bagels/ sandwiches)

Moderate Growth 2011 (2.5-7.0\%) and Relative Flat Increases 2010-11 Dept Stores-national chains

- Discounters-regional chains
- Dollar stores


## Supply \& Demand Dynamics of BSM Space

Weight of Growth: Net Store Expansion vs, Intemal Rate of Growth (Comp Sales)
Distribution by Format 1996-2012E

|  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Store } \\ & \hline 2006 \end{aligned}$ | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | $\begin{aligned} & 2007- \\ & 2011 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2001- \\ & 2006 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1996- \\ & 2000 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Sales } \\ & 2006 \end{aligned}$ | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | $\begin{gathered} \text { 2012- } \\ \text { YTD } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2007- \\ 2011 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2001- \\ & 2006 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1996- \\ & 2000 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| U.S. Total Channel Index | 3.25\% | 2.30\% | 0.92\% | -0.79\% | 0.13\% | 1.16\% | 2.08\% | 0.28\% | 2.64\% | 5.62\% | 3.07\% | 0.68\% | -2.06\% | 0.87\% | 3.10\% | 3.14\% | 2.26\% | 1.1\% | 2.7\% | 4.47\% |
| Shopping Center Index | 2.60\% | 1.10\% | 0.02\% | -1.30\% | 0.30\% | 1.10\% | 1.60\% | -0.2\% | 1.30\% | 4.90\% | 3.10\% | 0.79\% | -2.45\% | 0.75\% | 3.02\% | 3.45\% | 2.57\% | 1.10\% | 2.50\% | 4.10\% |
| Mall-based: Dept Store/Apparel/Soft Goods | 1.9\% | 1.3\% | -1.5\% | -2.6\% | 1.1\% | -0.9\% | -0.1\% | -1.9\% | -0.3\% | 3.1\% | 3.6\% | 0.5\% | -6.6\% | -2.3\% | 5.0\% | 5.5\% | 3.8\% | 4.2\% | 2.1\% | 3.8\% |
| Power Centers: Superstores-Soft \& Durable Goods [Lifestyle \& Category Killers] | 3.3\% | 2.5\% | 1.0\% | -1.4\% | 1.4\% | 1.7\% | 2.6\% | -0.1\% | 2.6\% | 5.2\% | 2.6\% | 0.4\% | -1.3\% | 0.1\% | 2.8\% | 2.6\% | 3.0\% | 1.0\% | 2.2\% | 4.0\% |
| Neighborhood Ctr: GroceryAnchor/Convenience Retail | 2.5\% | 0.2\% | 0.5\% | -0.3\% | -0.9\% | 1.8\% | 2.1\% | 0.9\% | 1.7\% | 6.2\% | 3.1\% | 1.4\% | 0.5\% | -0.4\% | 1.2\% | 2.3\% | 0.9\% | 1.0\% | 3.1\% | 4.5\% |
| Freestanding Value | 4.8\% | 4.0\% | 2.7\% | 0.6\% | 0.7\% | 1.0\% | 2.6\% | 0.6\% | 4.1\% | 6.0\% | 3.70\% | 3.20\% | 2.10\% | -0.30\% | 1.70\% | 3.30\% | 4.11\% | 2.00\% | 4.50\% | 6.00\% |
| Warehouse Clubs | 4.3\% | 4.9\% | 3.7\% | 1.9\% | 0.0\% | 2.0\% | 2.7\% | 1.4\% | 4.5\% | 4.0\% | 4.1\% | 4.5\% | 4.1\% | 0.8\% | 3.1\% | 4.9\% | 5.5\% | 3.5\% | 5.0\% | 6.4\% |
| Supercenters | 11.9\% | 8.1\% | 6.9\% | 3.8\% | 0.0\% | 3.6\% | 3.3\% | 2.6\% | 13.3\% | 18.4\% | 3.3\% | 2.0\% | 0.2\% | -1.4\% | 0.3\% | 1.6\% | 2.7\% | 0.5\% | 4.1\% | 5.6\% |
| New Concepts | 20.9\% | 13.5\% | 12.8\% | 5.0\% | 6.2\% | 8.5\% | 10.3\% | 6.4\% | 13.4\% | 13.8\% | 7.2\% | 6.3\% | -4.4\% | 2.5\% | 8.8\% | 9.4\% | 6.9\% | 4.5\% | 8.2\% | NM |
| By Format |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Foreign Chains US- based | 6.1\% | 6.2\% | 8.3\% | 3.4\% | 3.5\% | 4.6\% | 5.3\% | 2.7\% | 6.1\% | 9.7\% | 6.8\% | 8.0\% | 1.3\% | 3.1\% | 5.8\% | 4.7\% | 4.2\% | 4.6\% | 6.1\% | 5.2\% |
| Manufacturer Brands (Soft \& Durable Goods) | 3.5\% | 2.5\% | 1.6\% | -0.9\% | 0.9\% | 1.2\% | 2.1\% | 0.1\% | 4.5\% | 7.4\% | 7.2\% | 6.9\% | -2.9\% | -0.7\% | 5.7\% | 4.4\% | 4.6\% | 2.7\% | 4.3\% | 3.1\% |
| Superstores: Discount/ Off-Price (Soft Goods) | 10.9\% | 50.5\% | 4.9\% | 3.9\% | -0.5\% | 1.2\% | 5.5\% | 2.2\% | 6.8\% | 6.7\% | 2.7\% | 0.6\% | -0.1\% | 0.9\% | 2.8\% | 2.7\% | 3.0\% | 1.2\% | 2.2\% | 3.9\% |
| Superstores: Category Killers (Durable Goods) | 4.1\% | 3.2\% | 1.7\% | -0.1\% | 1.8\% | 2.0\% | 2.7\% | 0.4\% | 3.8\% | 8.3\% | 1.3\% | -1.1\% | -5.8\% | -3.8\% | 2.6\% | 1.5\% | 3.0\% | -1.1\% | 2.8\% | 4.7\% |
| Luxury Brand Apparel (US \& Foreign) | 9.4\% | 11.1\% | 3.6\% | 3.0\% | 4.6\% | 2.3\% | 3.8\% | 1.6\% | 9.6\% | 25.1\% | 8.4\% | 8.5\% | -10.5\% | -0.2\% | 11.6\% | 12.1\% | 4.1\% | 4.3\% | 6.2\% | 7.6\% |
| Luxury-Affordable/ Aspirational Apparel | 23.0\% | 21.4\% | 17.9\% | 12.7\% | 13.7\% | 4.9\% | 16.5\% | 7.4\% | 16.3\% | 16.4\% | 10.8\% | 6.6\% | -10.5\% | -0.4\% | 13.8\% | 15.3\% | 7.4\% | 5.0\% | 7.1\% | 2.1\% |
| Lifestyle Apparel Formats | 5.8\% | 7.4\% | 1.4\% | -1.5\% | 0.8\% | 1.5\% | 2.3\% | 0.0\% | 6.1\% | 12.3\% | 2.9\% | 2.1\% | -5.7\% | -1.8\% | 4.2\% | 4.3\% | 4.8\% | 0.6\% | 3.8\% | 5.6\% |
| Cheap Chic Apparel/Décor Mall/Strip/Freestanding | 10.0\% | 10.6\% | 10.3\% | 7.8\% | 8.6\% | 9.7\% | 9.5\% | 4.2\% | 10.2\% | 18.3\% | 4.8\% | 8.4\% | 1.3\% | 4.2\% | -0.1\% | 4.8\% | 4.9\% | 3.6\% | 9.1\% | 5.9\% |
| Factory Outlet Stores | 3.6\% | 4.3\% | 0.6\% | -1.6\% | 0.9\% | 1.0\% | 4.4\% | -0.3\% | 4.0\% | 3.3\% | 7.5\% | 4.4\% | -9.1\% | -4.6\% | 3.7\% | 4.2\% | 2.5\% | -0.3\% | 4.7\% | 1.7\% |
| Generational Formats |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Boomer/ Gen-X) | 2.2\% | 1.8\% | 0.4\% | -0.9\% | -0.4\% | -2.0\% | 0.0\% | -0.2\% | -0.7\% | 6.2\% | 6.7\% | 4.2\% | -5.2\% | 0.0\% | 7.9\% | 6.9\% | 5.2\% | 2.8\% | 5.7\% | 5.7\% |
| Millennials/ Gen-X | 0.7\% | 2.4\% | -3.5\% | -5.0\% | -1.4\% | -2.1\% | -1.4\% | -2.1\% | -0.1\% | 5.0\% | 8.7\% | 6.6\% | -2.2\% | 3.9\% | 8.5\% | 8.5\% | 6.4\% | 5.1\% | 5.5\% | 5.0\% |
| Gen-Y (teen) | 6.5\% | 2.8\% | 2.7\% | 0.9\% | 2.7\% | 5.3\% | 7.5\% | 0.9\% | 4.7\% | 2.5\% | 6.8\% | 3.1\% | -0.3\% | 3.7\% | 7.8\% | 6.2\% | 6.5\% | 4.1\% | 3.7\% | 4.1\% |
| Gen-Z (tweener/kids/infants) | 5.8\% | 5.8\% | 4.0\% | 0.4\% | -5.4\% | 0.2\% | 2.9\% | 1.1\% | 7.6\% | -1.0\% | 5.4\% | 1.5\% | -4.5\% | -3.9\% | 4.4\% | 5.3\% | 5.2\% | 0.6\% | 4.1\% | 4.2\% |
| Income Distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Affluent Shopping Outlets (\$75-K incomes) | -1.1\% | 4.2\% | 0.1\% | 0.1\% | 2.6\% | 3.0\% | 5.9\% | 0.1\% | 1.5\% | 7.9\% | 6.7\% | 6.0\% | -5.7\% | 0.6\% | 5.7\% | 6.2\% | 4.3\% | 2.8\% | 5.9\% | 7.5\% |
| Middle Class-Upper Outlets (\$45-\$74K) | 4.0\% | 4.8\% | 2.2\% | -1.1\% | 1.2\% | 1.1\% | 2.2\% | 0.3\% | 3.9\% | 6.3\% | 4.4\% | 3.2\% | -4.3\% | -2.9\% | 4.5\% | 4.9\% | 4.2\% | 1.1\% | 3.3\% | 3.2\% |
| Middle Class-Lower Outlets (\$25-\$44- K) | 2.8\% | 0.0\% | -0.4\% | -1.3\% | -3.1\% | 0.6\% | 1.5\% | 0.2\% | 1.5\% | 5.3\% | 4.2\% | 1.8\% | -4.8\% | -2.3\% | 1.2\% | 1.9\% | 1.8\% | -0.4\% | 2.9\% | 2.8\% |

Retail FOOTPRNNT BASE Store Capacity
Base Supply: Share \& Expansion by Units and Square Footage Distribution by Format 1996-2012E

|  | Store <br> Base | Share <br> of Base | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Share } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Base } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Share } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Base } \end{aligned}$ | Indexed Store Base | Annual | Growth <br> CAGR | Growth <br> CAGR | Base <br> Square | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Share } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Total } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Share } \\ \text { of } \\ \text { Total } \end{gathered}$ | Indexed Sq Footage | Growth <br> CAGR | Growth <br> CAGR | Avg. Store <br> Size |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Supply | Store | Store | Store | 2012 to | Open | Store Base | Store Base | Footage | Sq Ft | Sq Ft | 2012 to | Sq Ft | Sq Ft | Sq Ft | 2012 to |
|  | 2011 | 2012 | 2005 | 1996 | 2002 | 2012E | 2005-12 | 1996-04 | 2011 | 2012E | 2005 | 2002 | 2005-12 | 1996-04 | 2011 | 2005 |
| U.S. Total Channel Index | 419,638 | 100.0\% | 100\% | 100\% | 1.17 | 3.8\% | 1.2\% | 4.1\% | 6,343,654 | 100\% | 100\% | 1.20 | 1.7\% | 2.8\% | 28,353 | (338) |
| Competitive Supply (EX-FOC) | 175,251 | 42.1\% | 37.3\% | 27.9\% | 1.40 | 3.8\% | 3.1\% | 7.5\% | 3,661,252 | 58.0\% | 53.3\% | 1.43 | 2.9\% | 7.0\% | 29,271 | 211 |
| Noncompetitive (EX-FOC) | 244,387 | 57.9\% | 62.7\% | 72.1\% | 1.04 | 3.7\% | 0.0\% | 2.5\% | 2,682,402 | 42.0\% | 46.7\% | 0.99 | 0.1\% | -0.4\% | 28,812 | (64) |
| Shopping Center: Multi-Leased Space | 261,645 | 62.1\% | 71.4\% | 78.5\% | 0.99 | 4.1\% | -0.8\% | 3.0\% | 4,764,349 | 74.8\% | 77.5\% | 1.13 | 1.1\% | 1.8\% | 38,239 | (791) |
| Mall-based: Anchor/Inline Dept Store/Apparel/Soft Goods | 73,727 | 17.2\% | 21.3\% | 28.2\% | 0.88 | 5.0\% | -1.8\% | 0.8\% | 852,432 | 13.2\% | 15.3\% | 0.93 | -0.6\% | -1.3\% | 53,135 | $(3,342)$ |
| Power Centers: SuperstoresSoft \& Durables [Lifestyle /Category Killers] | 62,702 | 15.0\% | 19.1\% | 19.5\% | 0.91 | 3.6\% | -2.1\% | 3.6\% | 1,796,827 | 28.1\% | 28.3\% | 1.21 | 1.5\% | 2.5\% | 35,450 | 781 |
| Neighborhood Center: GroceryAnchor/Inline Convenience Retail | 125,216 | 29.9\% | 31.0\% | 30.8\% | 1.12 | 3.8\% | 0.6\% | 4.4\% | 2,115,090 | 33.6\% | 33.8\% | 1.16 | 1.6\% | 2.9\% | 26,133 | 187 |
| Freestanding Formats: Net leased/Out parcels | 120,622 | 28.9\% | 27.1\% | 24.6\% | 1.27 | 3.6\% | 2.2\% | 5.2\% | 1,192,979 | 19.1\% | 15.9\% | 1.72 | 4.4\% | 9.3\% | 98.189 | 201 |
| Warehouse Clubs | 1,440 | 0.3\% | 0.3\% | 0.3\% | 1.34 | 2.8\% | 3.0\% | 4.8\% | 192,882 | 3.1\% | 2.8\% | 1.42 | 3.0\% | 4.7\% | 118,267 | 1,489 |
| Supercenters | 3,658 | 0.9\% | 0.6\% | 0.2\% | 2.10 | 3.6\% | 5.7\% | 16.4\% | 654,825 | 10.5\% | 8.1\% | 2.14 | 5.6\% | 17.0\% | 169,368 | (447) |
| Restaurants | 115,524 | 27.7\% | 26.1\% | 24.1\% | 1.25 | 3.6\% | 2.0\% | 5.1\% | 345,273 | 5.5\% | 5.0\% | 1.37 | 3.1\% | 4.8\% | 6,933 | (438) |
| Freestanding: Category Killers/ Entertainment / Fitness Ctr | 9,323 | 2.2\% | 2.2\% | 2.0\% | 1.18 | 3.4\% | 1.5\% | 4.8\% | 689,664 | 10.8\% | 10.6\% | 1.34 | 2.0\% | 7.1\% | 35,079 | $(9,868)$ |
| Entertainment (music/kids play /theaters) | 2,642 | 0.6\% | 0.7\% | 1.0\% | 0.77 | 3.0\% | -1.3\% | 0.7\% | 167,311 | 2.6\% | 3.0\% | 0.93 | -0.1\% | 3.4\% | 18,169 | $(6,002)$ |
| Category Killers (electronics/DIY home/ furniture/sports interactive) | 5,230 | 1.2\% | 1.2\% | 0.9\% | 1.43 | 1.9\% | 2.3\% | 7.4\% | 478,296 | 7.5\% | 6.8\% | 1.61 | 3.2\% | 8.7\% | 48,256 | $(17,960)$ |
| Fitness Centers | 1,451 | 0.4\% | 0.3\% | 0.1\% | 1.77 | 9.9\% | 4.7\% | 12.4\% | 44,056 | 0.7\% | 0.8\% | 1.24 | -0.6\% | 14.5\% | 38,813 | (5,642) |
| Freestanding Apparel/ Shoes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Apparel Brands/Destination | 335 | 0.1\% | 0.2\% | 0.2\% | 0.45 | 8.4\% | -11.0\% | 3.6\% | 1,722 | 0.03\% | 0.02\% | 2.60 | 8.1\% | 15.9\% | 6,416 | 104 |
| CORE FORMATS (ex-restaurants) | 203,885 | 48.4\% | 50.0\% | 55.9\% | 1.11 | 3.8\% | 0.8\% | 2.6\% | 4,797,592 | 75.4\% | 76.2\% | 1.18 | 1.5\% | 2.2\% | 25,191 | (492) |
| DERIVATIVE Formats (ex-restaurants) | 67,158 | 16.2\% | 16.2\% | 14.1\% | 1.18 | 5.3\% | 1.2\% | 5.8\% | 654,865 | 10.6\% | 10.2\% | 1.24 | 2.2\% | 4.9\% | 16,274 | $(1,638)$ |
| Derivatives: Mass [Dpt stores/ discount/ off-price) | 3,782 | 0.9\% | 0.7\% | 0.5\% | 1.48 | 6.3\% | 5.1\% | 7.8\% | 66,365 | 1.1\% | 1.1\% | 1.21 | 1.7\% | 7.5\% | 29,708 | $(6,711)$ |
| Derivative: Apparel/ Accessories/ Shoes/ HBA | 28,696 | 6.8\% | 6.9\% | 4.6\% | 1.23 | 4.5\% | 1.1\% | 9.3\% | 92,449 | 1.5\% | 1.5\% | 1.36 | 1.7\% | 7.7\% | 4,748 | (178) |
| Derivatives: Durables/ Category Killers | 17,180 | 4.2\% | 4.7\% | 5.3\% | 0.99 | 5.5\% | -0.6\% | 3.2\% | 173,489 | 2.8\% | 3.1\% | 0.93 | 0.2\% | 5.8\% | 10,312 | $(2,129)$ |
| Derivatives: Value-Supercenter/ Warehouse Club | 220 | 0.1\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | NM | 89.1\% | 39.2\% | NM | 8,748 | 0.2\% | 0.0\% | NM | 26.8\% | NM | 76,106 | 0 |
| Derivatives: Food grocery | 5,247 | 1.3\% | 0.9\% | 0.9\% | 1.63 | 8.0\% | 6.2\% | 5.1\% | 206,477 | 3.3\% | 2.8\% | 1.49 | 4.2\% | 3.9\% | 33,829 | (93) |

SHARE WARS: Levels of New Capacity
Pipeline of Openings: Cycle and FommatShare
Distribution by Format 2001-2013E

|  | Store | Pipeline |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Base Supply | Share |  | Share |  |
|  |  | Open |  | Closed |  |
|  | 2011 | 2012E | 2005 | 2012E | 2005 |
| Mall-based | 73,727 | 23.1\% | 22.6\% | 53.2\% | 40.7\% |
| Conventional Anchors Dpt Store | 5,533 | 0.3\% | 0.7\% | 1.3\% | 0.7\% |
| Mall-based In-line Shops | 68,194 | 22.8\% | 21.9\% | 52.0\% | 39.9\% |
| Mall-soft in-lines | 62,224 | 21.8\% | 20.5\% | 49.6\% | 36.0\% |
| Mall Specialty Apparel (moderate price/value) | 23,666 | 14.6\% | 12.8\% | 34.9\% | 21.4\% |
| Luxury Brands (upscale) | 877 | 0.2\% | 0.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Mall Shoes | 17,029 | 3.6\% | 3.8\% | 8.9\% | 5.8\% |
| Mall Accessories | 10,921 | 2.3\% | 1.7\% | 2.7\% | 3.3\% |
| Mall HBA (cosmetic) | 3,761 | 0.2\% | 0.5\% | 0.8\% | 1.6\% |
| Mall-hard in-lines | 4,733 | 0.7\% | 1.1\% | 1.7\% | 2.0\% |
| Mall-Entertainment | 1,237 | 0.3\% | 0.4\% | 0.6\% | 1.9\% |
| Department Stores | 5,533 | 0.3\% | 0.7\% | 1.3\% | 0.7\% |
| National Dept Stores | 1,178 | 0.0\% | 0.1\% | 0.2\% | 0.0\% |
| Regional Dept Stores | 1,904 | 0.2\% | 0.4\% | 0.5\% | 0.4\% |
| Upscale Dept Stores | 282 | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.1\% |
| Moderate Price Dept Stores | 2,169 | 0.0\% | 0.2\% | 0.5\% | 0.3\% |
| Accessories (All segments) | 14,256 | 3.3\% | 2.9\% | 3.7\% | 5.7\% |
| Mall-based Accessories | 10,921 | 2.3\% | 1.7\% | 2.7\% | 3.3\% |
| Jewelry | 5,389 | 1.3\% | 1.2\% | 2.2\% | 3.3\% |
| Leather, handbags | 2,388 | 1.2\% | 1.3\% | 0.1\% | 0.2\% |
| Intimates | 1,944 | 0.5\% | 0.3\% | 0.4\% | 0.7\% |
| Sunglasses, eyewear | 4,535 | 0.3\% | 0.1\% | 1.0\% | 1.4\% |
| HBA/Cosmetics (mall) | 3,439 | 0.6\% | 0.5\% | 0.5\% | 0.6\% |
| Specialty Apparel | 37,899 | 13.1\% | 12.1\% | 23.2\% | 11.6\% |
| Mall apparel-Moderate price | 23,666 | 14.6\% | 12.8\% | 34.9\% | 21.4\% |
| Strip Ctr \& Freestanding | 18,782 | 18.3\% | 11.2\% | 29.9\% | 13.5\% |
| Manufacturer Brands \& Licensing | 4,798 | 3.9\% | 1.7\% | 1.0\% | 0.8\% |
| Luxury Brand (US \& Foreign) | 1,058 | 0.3\% | 0.4\% | 0.0\% | 0.1\% |
| Luxe-Affordable/ Aspirational | 2,303 | 2.5\% | 0.6\% | 0.1\% | 0.0\% |
| Moderate-Price/Mass Market | 30,743 | 8.1\% | 9.9\% | 22.3\% | 11.5\% |
| Cheap Chic: Multi-Freestand | 4,887 | 3.3\% | 1.5\% | 0.8\% | 0.1\% |
| Lifestyle: Apparel/ Shoes/HBA <br> (Ex-accessories) | 13,973 | 3.5\% | 4.1\% | 3.3\% | 1.9\% |
| Lifestyle: Durable Gods (sports décor, value superstores, etc) | 20,624 | 3.0\% | 6.1\% | 7.4\% | 5.7\% |
| Lifestyle: Grocers | 5,201 | 3.0\% | 0.9\% | 0.3\% | 0.5\% |



| Pipeline |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Annual Avg. |  |  |
| Open |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 2007-2010 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2003- \\ & 2006 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2001 \\ & 2002 \end{aligned}$ |
| 4,065 | 5,947 | 6,46 |
| 120 | 241 | 117 |
| 3,944 | 5,706 | 6,349 |
| 3,776 | 5,187 | 5,865 |
| 2,445 | 3,122 | 3,684 |
| 46 | 62 | 43 |
| 616 | 914 | 827 |
| 389 | 435 | 487 |
| 112 | 136 | 341 |
| 119 | 289 | 338 |
| 50 | 230 | 147 |
| 120 | 241 | 117 |
| 16 | 25 | 36 |
| 50 | 159 | 46 |
| 9 | 9 | 13 |
| 46 | 49 | 23 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 590 | 637 | 711 |
| 389 | 435 | 487 |
| 169 | 323 | 296 |
| 203 | 186 | 150 |
| 90 | 84 | 138 |
| 128 | 44 | 127 |
| 140 | 118 | 251 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1,927 | 2,883 | 3,259 |
| 2,445 | 3,122 | 3,684 |
| 2,432 | 2,608 | 2,405 |
| 396 | 440 | 204 |
| 57 | 75 | 54 |
| 235 | 126 | 63 |
| 1,366 | 2,454 | 2,875 |
| 392 | 272 | 292 |
| 664 | 908 | 1,299 |
| 536 | 1,328 | 1,310 |
| 351 | 259 | 168 |

AC-DC: Acceleration-Deceleration [Rate of RightSizing the Footpint]
Rate of Expansion \& Contraction of Base Supply: Gross Openings vs. Closings
Distribution by Format 1996-2013E


Retail MAXIM: Alternative Retail Risk Analysis for Alternative Capital

LQUIDATION LEVES: Right Sizing for Productivity Growth
Gross Closings: Levels, Pipeline Share and Rate
Distribution by Format 2001-2012E



## NEXT! Format Innovation

|  |  | Pipeli Open | Futur | U.S. <br> Store | Avg. Size |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Retailer | Format/ Trer | 2011+ | Capacity | Bas | Sq. Ft. |
|  | Apparel: Dual-Gender-Lifestyle-College \& Global Flagships |  |  |  |  |
| Wonder! | Wonder! a one-stop shopping solution for kids focuses on children ages birth to seven years for all their needs: From baby gear, furniture, bedding, apparel to toys). First 135,000 sf store opened in Deerfield, ill. The brainchild of entrepreneur Shane Christensen, the company plans to expand the concept into other major markets in the next year plus an e-commerce site. Bill Colaianni, former Walmart chief marketing officer is serving as CEO seeks to consolidate the fragmented children's sector into one big Walmart-type box with added features include half-acre interactive play area with 20 -ft. live trees, 10 classrooms, a stage for special events, concerts and activities. To always provide a new play experience, the retailer plans to frequently change the play area's components, space for customized parties. | 1 | NA |  | 135,00 |
| Bottega Veneta |  <br>  <br>  <br>  <br>  | 4 | NA | 14 | 2,20 |
| Akira | AKIRA: A Chicago-homegrown fashion boutique opened in 2002 in trendy Wicker Park/Bucktown neighborhood after the young, energetic, fashion-loving. Plans to expand in better malls within the region takes from urban Main Street to suburban Main Street. Over the last seven years, AKIRA has expanded to eleven stores and an e-tail website. AKIRA now offers a full line of Women's and Men's Clothing, Footwear, and Accessories. Known for high-profile and exciting fashion shows and parties in Chicago are dubbed the "social butterfly and leader of lifestyle branding. Target customer:18-40 years old. Men targets | 4 | NA | 12 | 5,50 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Brooks } \\ & \text { Brothers } \end{aligned}$ | The Brooks Brothers Flatiron Shop: Long a fashion outlet for Mad Man and gray flannel suits, BB opened its first younger generation concept in the Flatiron district of Manhattan that targets college students and young professionals with traditional preppy office and casual clothes. The theme is less formal and playful for both genders. BB is capitalizing on the New Millennial Normal trend. The 7,200 sf store is found in an old Lord \& Taylor destination supporting exposed brick walls and wood beams. Claudio Del Vecchio, Brooks Brothers' CEO looks at the new store as a laboratory. "We know what our existing customer thinks of this product," he said. "But we wanted to give the next generation of Brooks Brothers customer an environment to attract them so we can have a more direct relationship. A second Brooks Brothers Flatiron will open in Toronto in the spring 2012. From 1884 to 1915, when the company's Madison Avenue flagship opened, BB had been housed in a location at Broadway and 22nd Street, two blocks away from this store. In addition, in 1901 Brooks introduced its first sack suit for men after noticing that university students were using flatirons to flatten their lapels. Supersizing urban stores. | 2 | NA | 35 | 7,20 |
| Hale Bob | HALE BOB: The LA-based fashion brand known for its embellished and print-driven fabrics opened its first store on Robertson Boulevard. The 2,800 sf store that shares the block with other brands "redefining the moment:" Seven For All Mankind, Tory Burch, Anya Hindmarch and Alice + Olivia. Roberston is the strip for global exposure in the Global-Local Normal that grows brand equity. VP Ionescu also will leverage the store to develop a global "licensing" business which is part of the New Monetization Normal." Designed by Philippe Puron, architect for residences of Uber class, the space reflects a metropolitan loft (modern with black and white walls, and concrete flooring, open as stage for displays and events. Price points are affordable luxe for affluent middle class shoppers of Coach \& Tory Burch at $\$ 100-\$ 250$ for tops, $\$ 200-\$ 400$ for dresses. The brand distributes wholesale- 2,000 accounts US, UK and European dept stores accounts. (Blloomies to Harvey Nicks \& EI Corte Inglés. For the last three years, store sales have grown by15-20\% annually with $50 \%$ of revenues overseas. The Robertson store is expected to generate $\$ 2.8$ million the first year ( $\$ 1,000 \mathrm{psf}$ ). Future sites; NYC , Miami, Las Vegas plus overseas, | 1 | NA |  | 2,800 |
|  | Apparel: Lifestyle/ Fashion Apparel/ Niche-Bridal <br> Lifestyle brand New Era said it has opened its eleventh global flagship store, located in the West Hollywood shopping district of Los Angeles. The brand's first West Coast retail space joins current U.S. locations in New York, Chicago and Atlanta. The 3,300-sq.-ft. store will house licensed and New Era branded headwear, apparel and accessories for men, women and kids. "We have completely re-energized our design concepts for our flagships," said Cal Lawson, director of retail operations. "Our updated store concept allows for fully integrated merchandising of apparel, headwear and accessories. |  |  |  |  |
| New Era |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Dining Fast Food: Chicken-Global |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Pollo } \\ & \text { Campero } \end{aligned}$ | Pollo Campero, the fast-growing Latin chicken chain, unveiled a new prototype designed by Interbrand Design Forum. Created with the American consumer in mind, the new design debuted in Webster, Texas. Two other locations are due to open in the Houston area by yearend. "Pollo Campero is a huge hit in Central America, but it needed to be brought to the U.S. in a bigger and more relevant way. The modern iteration of the US concept will make it more accessible to a wider range of American consumers. Currently, the global 300 -chian store Pollo operates 50 US locations, with plans for additional sites. | 20 | NA | 50 | 1,500 |
|  | Dollar Stores: Hybrid Food \& GM |  |  |  |  |
| Dollar General | "DG Market" the deepest discount for foodies will accelerate ist rollout in 2012. 40 DG Markets will open in both new and existing markets based on the success of the concept. "The results of the DG Market remodels we have completed to date and the early success of our five DG Market stores in Las Vegas have been encouraging," according to CEO Rick Dreiling. DG Markets have average annual sales of $\$ 4$ million to $\$ 5$ million, versus the $\$ 1.4$ million across the regular formats. The mix is more consumable so the margin percent is somewhat lower but the raw dollar volume is very impressive with opportunities in smaller markets that provide a vehicle to grab share. By expanding its cooler systems, DG will add new items such as food deserts that will appeal to rural and metro markets and drive traffic and share. "Fresh and refrigerated foods helped us drive customer traffic and increase basket size by seeing a greater share of our customers' needs." Dreiling said | 25 | 20,000 | 9,800 | 17,000 |
|  | Electronics-Category Killers-HYBRIDS-Omni-Channel Platform |  |  |  |  |
| Best Buy | CITYVILLE-The Electronic Epicenter: Best Buy is one of the early retailers trying to tap the "gamification," a marketing concept that fuses social media, entertainment and commerce. To create the complete entertainment is modeled after the Epicenter and CONCEPT Store formats that have been fusing all aspects of life under one roof. It is less about one-stop shopping and more about a "full body \& mind" experience with access to a bigger platform of goods and services that can be personalized. Much like TIVO did for TV viewing, offering real and analog programming. | 0 | NA | TEST | (1n-In- <br> Store |
|  | Electronics: Brands-Clobal-College Campus/ Transport (New Points-of-Sale) |  |  |  |  |
| Apple | Apple is advancing beyond urban global cities and malls in next stage of expansion: College campuses and transportation hubs (air \& rail) joining other retailers targeting youth and peripatetic consumers in a (digitally) mobile age that nets tourists as well as harried workers inclined to spend on bigger ticket baskets for quality goods offering convenience such as fresh food. Specialty-organic \& limited assortment grocers, books and sports superstores, fashion specialty bands and discounters (Walmart \& Target) now have college stores and are converging on transport hubs for high traffic. College is the last mile and transport the great global interceptor. Apple signed a 10 -yr lease with NYC's MTA to open a 23,000 -sf store at Grand Central at a rent $\$ 800,000$ ( $\$ 35 \mathrm{psf} \mathrm{w} / 25 \%$ CPI years) for vacated restaurant space. These are the new epicenters of a mobile consumer and colleges high density \& captive audiences w/ untapped purchasing power from students, their parents and tourists that visit--the rationale for Barnes \& Noble at Yale U. Prime transport hubs are finite but universities plentiful and sustainable by rolling graduates and inter-generational shoppers. All are capitalizing on th Tourist Economy Normal reported b MAXIM. | 20 | TBA | 357-US | 6,000 |
|  | Electronics: Pop Up-Dotcom-Omni-Channel Platform |  |  |  |  |
| Goog |  <br>  of iconic flagships in expensive locations. Google launched an online fashion store last year, Boutique.com that is looking at leveraging Amazon's Zappo success and luxury flash sites such as Nordstrom's HauteLook. | 1 | TEST | ----- | Pop Up |
|  | Factory Outilet Stores: Online Virtual Formats-Omni-Channel Platform |  |  |  |  |
| ebayl factory outlet | Ebay is entering the factory outlet store space with a new lifestyle store in the aftermath of the 2008 financial meltdown where wealth destruction was across classes. While Retail MAXIM issued a 2010 report warning of the US-FOC sector having peaking, a trend manifested in 2011, complicated by FOC stores going to mainstream sites that are braking down the 30 -year old radius restriction. A newcomer to the sector-ebay-FOC-online stands to add more friction to sales of centers that are truly offering deeper discounts than the dept stores. ebay FOC concept will remain virtual unlike dept store... | NM | NM | ---- | E-COM |
|  | Home Décori/Furnishings: Lifestyle-Boutique |  |  |  |  |
| No. 9 Christ (C Burch) | No. 9 Christopher: another Christopher Burch concept that the eponymous stylist/merchant has been has been nurturing for six years. The $50,000-$ sf store will feature highly elegant furniture that can be order as custom kitchen and custom library. Burch seeks to reinvent the notion of lifestyle store with a comprehensive \& High-tech approach to generating styles for a diverse cliental. The store is wildly ambitious as Burch claims "there isn't a category that will not be addressed." Launch date: Next 18 mos. Location: NA. No. 9 part is rapidly growing stable of concepts (Burch stable is surpassing Lifestyle Wunderkin Drexler) | 1 | NA | ----- | 50,000 |

Sales Pulse. Same-store Sales Trends 2001-2012


## Sales Puise. Same-store Sales Tiends 2001-2012

By OMN-CHANNEL INDEX:

|  | Annual |  |  | Qtrly | Qtrly | YTD | Recovery |  | Inflection |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Dec-2010 | Dec-2011 | 2011 | $\begin{aligned} & 2010- \\ & 2012 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2007- \\ & 2009 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 2005-2007 |
| OMIN-CHANNEL (Retail \& E-Com) | -0.06 | 6.23 | 6.00 | NA | NA | NA | 5.19 | -1.56 | 4.75 |
| ECOMMERCE of RETAILERS | 16.77 | 22.60 | 18.43 |  |  |  | 20.63 | 15.79 | 19.41 |
| RETAIL SALES of E-COM \& OMNI-Only | -2.07 | 4.54 | 3.25 |  |  |  | 3.90 | -1.53 | 3.25 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| OMIN-CHANNEL <br> (Retail \& E-Com) | -0.63 | 5.87 | 6.01 |  |  |  | 5.19 | -1.56 | 4.75 |
| ECOMMERCE of RETAILERS (Web Only) | 16.77 | 22.60 | 18.43 |  |  |  | 20.63 | 15.79 | 19.41 |
| RETAIL SALES of E-COM/OMNI Chains | -2.07 | 4.54 | 3.25 |  |  |  | 3.90 | -1.53 | 3.25 |
| Dept Store-OMN | -0.6 | 5.9 | 60 |  |  |  | 5. | -16 | 4.8 |
| Dept Store E-COM | 8.7 | 21.1 | 22.0 |  |  |  | 21.7 | - 8.2 | 4.8.2 |
| Dept Store RETAIL | -2.1 | 4.5 | 3.3 |  |  |  | 3.9 | -1.5 | 3.2 |
| Dopt Store Retal |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Apparel-OMNI | -4.1 | 3.2 | 5.3 |  |  |  | 3.7 | -2.4 | 6.8 |
| Apparel E-COM | 10.1 | 20.5 | 21.9 |  |  |  | 26.9 | 10.5 | 11.4 |
| Apparel RETAIL | -4.7 | 3.2 | 1.8 |  |  |  | 2.5 | -2.8 | 5.7 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Accessories OMNI | 7.8 | 23.0 | 23.4 |  |  |  | 25.7 | 4.3 | 6.8 |
| Accessories E-COM | 18.7 | 28.4 | 23.6 |  |  |  | 21.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Accessories RETAIL | 2.0 | 14.9 | 16.7 |  |  |  | 15.8 | 0.7 | 4.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Shoes OMNI | 2.9 | 5.8 | 4.6 |  |  |  | 4.6 | 1.8 | 3.0 |
| Shoes E-COM | 9.8 | 14.2 | 12.8 |  |  |  | 12.2 | 7.6 | 10.1 |
| Shoes RETAIL | 2.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 |  |  |  | 4.6 | 1.3 | 1.6 |
| Discounter/ Off-Pirce OMN | 0.0 | 5.2 | 6.4 |  |  |  | 58 | -37 | 1.3 |
| Discounter/Off-Price E-COM | 12.8 | 16.6 | 13.3 |  |  |  | 14.9 | $\begin{array}{r}-3.9 \\ \hline 10.9\end{array}$ | 7.7 |
| Discounter/ Off-price RETAIL | 2.0 | 2.4 | -0.6 |  |  |  | 0.9 | 0.3 | 2.2 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Supercenter/ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Warehouse Club OMNI | 1.9 | 4.4 | 8.5 |  |  |  | 6.5 | 0.8 | 3.0 |
| Supercenter/Warehouse E-COM | 8.0 | 12.0 | 11.8 |  |  |  | 11.9 | 8.0 | 12.0 |
| SupercenterWarehouse RETAIL | 2.4 | 0.7 | 2.6 |  |  |  | 1.7 | 2.6 | 4.7 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Durable/Category Killer OMNI | 0.1 | 5.5 | 2.4 |  |  |  | 3.0 | -1.3 | 1.7 |
| Durable/Category Killer E-COM | 23.3 | 34.8 | 21.6 |  |  |  | 28.5 | 24.3 | 25.0 |
| Durable/ CategoryKiller RETAIL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Décor/Furnishings OMNI | -0.8 | 6.3 | 0.9 |  |  |  | 3.6 | $-2.0$ | 1.8 |
| Décor/ Furnishings E-COM | 15.0 | 22.5 | 11.2 |  |  |  | 22.9 | 21.8 | 25.5 |
| Décor/ Furnishings RETAIL | -0.8 | 4.1 | -0.8 |  |  |  | 1.7 | -2.3 | -4.0 |

## Sales Pulse. Same-store Sales Trends 1997-2012

## Bricks \& Mortar Space

## By Chainl/Format

## Mall-Based Retail

|  | Annual |  |  | Qtrly | Qtrly |  |  | YTD |  |  | Inflect | Boom | Recess | Boom |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Dec-2010 | Dec-2011 | Jan-2012 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Feb- } \\ & 2012 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 2011 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 2010- \\ & 2012 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 2007- \\ & 2009 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 2005-2007 | $\begin{aligned} & 2002 \\ & 2004 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 2001 | 1997-2000 |
| Mall-based | -2.07 | 4.88 | 4.65 | 5.21 | 4.33 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 3.19 | 4.24 | -2.05 | 2.51 | 1.93 | -1.06 | 4.34 |
| Mall Soft Goods | -1.75 | 4.56 | 3.99 | 4.5 | 4.00 | -0.18 | 3.63 | 1.72 | 3.42 | -1.49 | 4.43 | 2.94 | -1.71 | 4.96 |
| Apparel-Women's | -3.87 | 5.01 | 3.46 | 4.6 | 3.38 | -3.35 | -1.15 | -2.25 | 2.07 | -4.06 | 1.87 | 1.55 | -0.26 | 5.57 |
| Ann Taylor | -30.0 | 19.3 | -1.2 | 20.9 | -11.0 |  |  |  | 9.05 | -21.9 | -0.5 | 0.77 | -5.20 | -0.45 |
| AT Loft | -12.7 | 0.5 | 5.4 | 19.1 | 8.0 |  |  |  | 2.95 | -9.7 | 1.5 | 9.20 | 5.30 | 9.50 |
| Anthroplogie (URBN) | 10.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 1.0 |  |  |  | 2.50 | 7.7 | 4.3 | 12.00 | -3.10 | -2.25 |
| Arden B (WTSLA) | 0.2 | 0.6 | -13.0 | 8.5 | -11.0 | -12.7 | -14.3 | -13.50 | -8.63 | -4.2 | -3.8 |  |  |  |
| Banana Republic | -9.0 | 3.0 | -1.0 | 1.0 | -2.0 | 6.0 | 12.0 | 9.00 | 3.67 | -7.4 | -1.7 | 5.67 | 3.00 | 6.25 |
| bebe | -24.2 | -2.3 | 8.4 | 0.0 | 9.6 |  |  |  | 3.05 | -17.9 | 0.8 | -1.00 | -2.50 | 12.58 |
| Body Central | 4.9 | 14.9 | 11.3 | 14.8 | 6.8 |  |  |  | 13.10 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 4.90 |  |  |
| Chicos | 6.1 | 6.4 | 8.2 | 1.0 | 8.7 |  |  |  | 7.30 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 17.23 | 14.20 | 31.60 |
| CHS: Chicos | 4.1 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 0.9 | 5.5 |  |  |  | 5.20 | 0.3 | 3.3 |  |  |  |
| White House/Black Market | 10.8 | 8.4 | 14.5 | 1.2 | 15.4 |  |  |  | 11.45 | 6.1 | 7.3 |  |  |  |
| Chris. \& Banks | -15.0 | -1.0 | -8.0 | -1.0 | -6.0 |  |  |  | -4.50 | -10.7 | 2.0 | -5.33 | 7.50 | 10.68 |
| Cache | -18.0 | -2.3 | 8.0 | -6.0 | 12.0 |  |  |  | 2.85 | -12.0 | 3.0 | 5.00 | -0.20 | 5.00 |
| Catherines (CHRS) | -7.0 | -2.0 | -4.0 | 2.0 | -2.0 |  |  |  | -3.00 | -5.5 | 3.7 | -0.67 | 6.80 | 6.60 |
| Club Monaco (RL) | 7.2 | 12.0 | 17.0 | 12.0 | 17.0 |  |  |  | 14.50 | 3.8 | 7.6 | 10.60 | 0.00 |  |
| Coldwater Creek | 9.0 | -20.5 | -14.0 | -20.5 | -11.4 |  |  |  | -17.3 | 2.6 | 4.0 |  |  |  |
| Destination Maternity (Mothers Work) | -4.3 | -5.1 | -4.1 | 1.2 | -4.1 |  |  |  | -4.60 | -3.6 | 0.2 | -0.80 | -2.40 | 9.45 |
| Express | -6.0 | 7.0 | 6.0 | 8.0 | 5.0 |  |  |  | 6.50 | -3.1 | -1.0 | -1.67 | -2.00 | -3.25 |
| Francesca's Collection | 9.8 | 15.0 | 15.2 | 14.5 | 14.1 |  |  |  | 15.10 | 9.4 | 2.2 | 2.35 |  |  |
| Jones NY | 2.0 | 1.0 | -8.0 | 2.5 | -3.0 |  |  |  | -3.50 | -2.2 | -4.4 | -3.07 | -8.80 | 4.80 |
| Lane Bryant (CHRS) | -15.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 11.0 | -1.0 |  |  |  | 2.00 | -11.5 | -0.3 | 2.33 | 3.00 | 4.25 |
| Michael Kors | 19.2 | 48.7 | 35.8 | 14.5 | 38.0 |  |  |  | 42.25 | 16.6 | 14.5 | 5.00 |  |  |
| New York \& Co. | -12.0 | 1.6 | -3.5 | 1.7 | -6.8 |  |  |  | -0.95 | -8.2 | 1.5 | 4.73 | -5.00 | 2.00 |
| Talbot's | -19.0 | -3.4 | -9.0 | -7.3 | -5.0 |  |  |  | -6.20 | -14.3 | -0.5 | -3.67 | -5.50 | 5.60 |
| Apparel-Men's | -4.1 | 1.4 | 5.0 | 1.6 | 3.4 |  |  |  | 3.19 | -3.73 | 1.76 | 2.45 | -8.10 | 1.96 |
| Casual Male | -10.8 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 1.0 | 0.8 |  |  |  | 1.05 | -6.5 | 4.7 | 1.93 |  |  |
| Casual Male (core CMRG/Rochester) | -10.8 | 1.5 | -7.9 | 2.9 | -7.5 |  |  |  | -3.20 | -5.0 | 4.7 | 1.93 | 0.00 |  |
| Destination XL (CMRG) |  |  | 12.1 |  | 9.0 |  |  |  | 12.10 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jos. A. Bank | 6.3 | 7.0 | 10.0 | 6.0 | 12.0 |  |  |  | 8.50 | 7.1 | 6.0 | 9.80 | -6.70 | 7.48 |
| Men's Wearhouse | -3.5 | 0.0 | 5.7 | 0.5 | 2.3 |  |  |  | 2.85 | -4.6 | 2.4 | 2.50 | -8.70 | 7.13 |
| Men's Wearhouse Core | -4.0 | 1.0 | 9.1 | 2.0 | 9.3 |  |  |  | 5.05 | -3.7 | 3.9 | 7.80 |  |  |
| MW: K\&G | -1.9 | -1.0 | 3.6 | -2.0 | -2.1 |  |  |  | 1.30 | -4.5 | -1.7 | 6.50 |  |  |
| Apparel-BrandsDual Gender | -1.2 | 6.1 | 3.3 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 4.8 | 8.2 | 6.51 | 5.27 | 0.16 | 7.90 | 4.11 | -3.81 | 2.66 |
| American Apparel | -7.0 | -14.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 7.0 | 15.0 | 11.0 | 13.00 | -0.33 | 4.3 | 26.3 |  |  |  |
| Calvin Klein-PVH | -5.0 | 13.0 | 12.0 | 4.0 | 15.0 | -11.2 |  | -11.20 | 4.60 | -2.1 | 5.7 | 5.33 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Citi Trends (Phat Farm) | 0.6 | -23.5 | -8.3 | -10.7 | -2.3 | 3.0 |  | 3.00 | -9.60 | 1.9 | 8.6 | 7.77 | 6.50 | 5.50 |
| Eddie Bauer | -15.0 | 18.0 | -8.0 | 8.8 | -1.0 |  |  |  | 5.00 | -9.5 | 0.6 | -6.00 | -15.40 | -3.50 |
| Esprit | -2.4 | -1.5 | -10.0 | -1.0 | -6.0 |  |  |  | -5.75 | 2.3 | 12.4 | 5.93 | 2.50 | 7.70 |
| The Gap | -7.0 | 1.0 | -3.0 | -8.0 | -4.0 | -5.0 | 1.0 | -2.00 | -1.33 | -7.8 | -5.7 | 3.67 | -9.00 | 7.83 |
| Guess (Full Price-US) | 5.3 | -2.9 | -3.5 | -1.1 | -5.0 |  |  |  | -3.20 | 4.9 | 12.0 | 5.33 | -2.90 | 5.70 |
| Heritage (PVH) | -6.0 | 8.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 |  |  |  | 5.00 |  |  |  | 0.00 | \#DIV/0! |
| Hilfiger (PVH) | -4.0 | 3.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 |  |  |  | 6.50 | -1.9 | 4.4 | -1.43 | 16.50 | 0.58 |
| J. Crew | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.0 | -5.0 | 6.0 |  |  |  | 3.50 | 2.3 | 9.2 | 4.30 | -18.50 | -0.23 |
| Joe Jeans | 10.0 | -7.0 | 0.0 | -7.0 | 12.0 |  |  |  | -3.50 | 8.5 |  |  |  |  |
| Kenneth Cole | -12.8 | 14.1 | -5.0 | 14.1 | -5.0 |  |  |  | 4.55 | -11.3 | -5.3 | -3.80 | -14.70 | 15.50 |


[^0]:    1 Deleevraging was one of the 24 New Normals identified in Retail MAXIM: Nov-Dec 2011, "Into Thin Air.
    Retail Rescued by an Avalanche of New Normal(s)." [Implications for Growth and Real Estate Productivity 2012
    \& Beyond].
    2 "Occupy Main Street. Down Market Real Estate Strategies Re-Risk Rent Rolls." [Tenant Credit Profile of New Store Cycle]. Retail MAXIMt February 2011.

[^1]:    3 "Into Thin Air. Retail Rescued by an Avalanche of New Normal(s)." [Implications for Growth and Real Estate Productivity 2012 \& Beyond]. Retail MAXIM Nov-Dec 2011. (Note: Measured Growth Was one of the 24 New Normals flagged by Retail MAXIM in its 2011 that

