Retail MAXIM

SAMPLE ISSUE

Alternative Retail Risk Analysis for Alternative Capital

Global 400 Retail Watch List: Index of Fundamental Values

Alternative Ratings for Alternative Capital

| | Intl Shr Index | US Shr Index | US Shr Index | US Shr Index |
|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | 2012 | 2012 | 2010 | 2007 |
| G-400 # Credits | 73 | 380 | 350 | 369 |
| Positive Watch | 78.1% | 51.8% | 56.6% | 32.5% |
| Optimal | 12.3% | 5.8% | 4.9% | 2.7% |
| Competitive | 49.3% | 31.8% | 30.3% | 18.2% |
| On-the-Cusp | 16.4% | 14.2% | 21.4% | 11.7% |
| Negative Watch | 21.9% | 48.2% | 43.1% | 66.1% |
| Challenged | 6.8% | 21.1% | 19.7% | 23.6% |
| Sinkholes | 13.7% | 22.1% | 21.7% | 36.3% |
| Terminal | 1.4% | 5.0% | 1.7% | 6.2% |

Fundamental Outlook: Distribution of Risk & Value

| | Intl Shr | US Shr | US S |
|---------------|----------|--------|------|
| | 2012 | 2012 | 201 |
| Improving | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Stable | 15.1% | 10.8% | 11.5 |
| Steady State | 45.2% | 41.6% | 32.2 |
| Volatile | 34.2% | 39.5% | 40.8 |
| Deteriorating | 5.5% | 8.2% | 16.7 |

Competitive Values of Down Market Retailer 1998-2012


US Shr

0.8%

9.5%

33.6%

34.1%



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Occupy Main Street Down Market Real Estate Strategies Re-Risk Rent Rolls [Tenant Credit Profile of New Store Cycle]

Position: No safety net for the middle? If Mitt Romney is talking about retail real estate then he has a point. To achieve the double-digit top line growth the next 5-8 years from doubling store capacity (as reported in "Going Rogue" *RM*: Jan 2012), high productivity-high margin retailers will need to trade down to the mass market. Based on the revised real estate strategies and new formats being tested, the push down market is underway. Main Street America is about to be occupied with the next generation of retail outlets designed for the New Economic Normal of Sub Par Growth and Downward Mobility.

Accompanying the expansion of high-margin retailers are sub prime and restructuring credits that have been inflating pipelines to generate instant equity to fund short-term liquidity and productivity short falls, other more brazen are double buildable capacity over the next 5-8 years much of which involves lower productivity formats and locations that allow for greater share gains. And if the new supply of distressed retailers driving the speculative side of going down market is not enough, there is the experimental stock of 300+ New Concepts flagged by the *MAX-SI Spatial Index* where down market strategies underpin half of the 20,000 stores that will open by 2014, which is nearly 40% of the growth of the 2,000 chains that comprise the Index.

Combined, the new store supply of this new pool of down market formats will not only increase absorption levels that have been depressed since 2007 but expand demand beyond the muchtreasured top 10% core of A-malls and strips into the 90% of B-centers in urban and suburban markets and lower density locations of exurbia and rural America, picking up where growth left off when the real estate bubble burst in 2008.

"Down market retail" will be driving a good portion of the demand for space in multi-lease projects the next several years, which seems counterintuitive in an economy purportedly on the mend where luxury and full price should be leading the next phase of real estate expansion. Down market strategies may be providing landlords with a larger pool of growth tenants but not without skewing the rent roll toward sub prime credits & formats. Just how much risk is embedded in the new store pipeline that will occupy the main streets of a muchbattered America has yet to be quantified. By all accounts, the capital backing the current cycle of store expansion and shopping center leasing entails the "re-risking" not de-risking of retail real estate at a time when a de-leveraging of bad collateral and assets is much needed to restore productivity and sustainable four-wall growth and productivity.

This month, *MAXIM* looks at the down market strategies being adopted by retailers, which is a complete reversal of the measured growth and intrinsic value creation discussed under the 24 New Normals in November 2011. There is a high degree of speculative growth in a pipeline trading down, some of which will be managed by tenant and landlord but much that portends to be the next cycle of workouts of liquidations. The rationale for down market real estate strategies is strong at this stage of the retail cycle and key to generating double-digit growth in selling GLA. Retailers and landlords just need to be aware of the trade offs of using a strategy that enables them to re-occupy Main Street America.

www.retailmaxim.net. Editor: Therese Byrne. Subscription inquiries, contact: 646-596-9116. US Coverage Edition: Annual: \$1,770. Overseas rate available. Ten issues. (Bi-monthly issues: Aug-Sept and Nov-Dec.) Copyright 2012 Pantheon LLC; all rights reserved.

Occupy Main Street Down Market Real Estate Strategies Re-Risk Rent Rolls [Tenant Credit Profile of New Store Cycle]

'As leases that were signed during the run-up in rents mature, they're likely to be renewed at lower prices. In fact, the U.S. General Services Administration last year saw a 2 percent reduction in rents. It also reduced the amount of space allocated per staffer. At the same time, landlords are facing increasing property expenses. And companies continue to downsize, in New York and across the country. And few companies are taking additional space in anticipation of growing into it, largely because of concerns of a global economic slowdown, driven by economic instability in Europe and China." Commercial Real Estate Direct Staff Report, 1/10/12

"Facebook has lost a number of storefront retailers in the past year, according to a Bloomberg story on Thursday. The pages allow customers to become "fans" of companies. Analyst Sucharita Mulpuru of Forrster Research told Bloomberg that the big bets on smart phones and tablets did not pan out as Facebook is not driving commerce to the retailer's store. "There was a lot of anticipation that Facebook would turn into a new destination, a store, a place where people would shop. But it was like trying to sell stuff to people while they're hanging out with their friends at the bar." Retailers no loner a fan of Facebook, discontinuing their alliance are: Gamestop, JC Penney, Gap and Nordstrom.'

"Facebook storefronts losing retailers." San Jose Bs Journal, 2/17/2012

"Outpost: Cabela's new small format designed as the next generation of sports retailing experience. The mini-40,000 sf format is targeting small markets (population less than 250,000) and underserved markets which as radical departure from the trend the past decade of the mass urban migration as retailers seek safety in density and a break form the past three decades of "hybrid" sports superstores locating to mega malls (such as The Mills) as retailers seek greater control over their real estate costs and destiny." MAX-SI Spatial Index, 2011 Q4

"I prefer to think that JCP is moving to price clarity and transparency. it's hardly a radical approach, but sometimes you need to reinforce the foundation before you go adding extra stories to a crumbling structure. Ryan Mathews, Black Monk Consulting

"Small formats and small markets sound on paper but the reality is players like Walmart do not have the supply chain to support small unless small equals the same volume of big stores in a given trade are or geography: To achieve the scale of supercenter sales in a region, a multiple of 100-200 express stores would be required, capacity highly improbable.".

Rethinking Retail Scale, Carol Spieckerman, newmarketbuilders, 10/2011

POSITION: Going Down Market to Re-Occupy America's New Main Street

No safety net for the middle? If Mitt Romney is talking about retail real estate then he has a point. To achieve the double-digit top line growth the next 5-8 years from doubling store capacity (as reported in "Going Rogue" *RM*: Jan 2012), high productivity-high margin retailers will need to trade down to the mass market. Based on the revised real estate strategies and new formats being tested, the push down market is underway. Main Street America is about to be occupied with the next generation of retail outlets designed for the New Economic Normal of Sub Par Growth and Downward Mobility.

Accompanying the expansion of high margin retailers are sub prime and restructuring credits that have been inflating pipelines to generate instant equity to fund short-term liquidity and productivity short falls, other more brazen are double buildable capacity over the next 5-8 years much of which involves lower productivity formats and locations that allow for greater share gains.

And if the new supply of distressed retailers driving the speculative side of going down market is not enough, there is the experimental stock of 300+ New Concepts flagged by the MAX-SI Spatial Index where down market strategies underpin half of the 20,000 stores that will open by 2014, which is nearly 40% of the growth of the 2,000 chains that comprise the Index.

Combined, the new store supply of this new pool of down market formats will not only increase absorption levels that have been depressed since 2007 but expand demand beyond the much-treasured top 10% core of A-malls and strips into the 90% of B-centers in urban and suburban markets and lower density locations of exurbia and rural America, picking up where growth left off when the real estate bubble burst in 2008. By all appearances, "down market retail" will be driving a good portion of the demand for space in multi-lease projects the next several years, which seems counterintuitive in an economy purportedly on the mend where luxury and full price should be leading the next phase of real estate expansion.

As the 24 New Normals listed in MAXIM 2011 has shown, there is nothing normal as in predictable in these modern times. What's different this time around is that sub prime retail credits rather than sub prime projects of shopping center and residential developers is driving the national expansion of real estate. Which is not to say that sub grade shopping centers and other locations will not be resurrected by the spatial demand of down market growth. 2011 was the best leasing years that B-malls have seen in nearly a decade. And the institutional capital and private equity of opportunistic funds being invested in such assets will seek out the most speculative of retailers looking for space in order to create a new baseline of value.

Down market strategies of retailers may be providing landlords with a larger pool of growth tenants but not without skewing the rent roll toward sub prime credits & formats. Just how much risk is embedded in the new store pipeline that will occupy the main streets of a much-battered America has yet to be quantified. The function of the store is in the process of adapting to new spatial dynamics, a theme discussed at length in the 2011 New Normal issue.

After four years of retrenchment of supply and stagnation in productivity, retailers and landlords are embracing the growth with little regard for any long term consequences of the ongoing structural shifts. Based on retail valuation metrics in Q1 2012, the capital markets is assigning a hefty value premium to current growth prospects. PE ratios have catapulted from 25 to 55 over this time last year where price not earnings is driving the multiple. PEG ratios for any retailer exhibiting strong growth are looking speculative at 1.5-2.0 times with no distinction made for credit quality.

Continues....

Takeaway: Re-Risking Rent Rolls: The Landlord's Big Bet on Short Term Growth

Retailers are increasing new store capacity that has renewed the demand for space after a near four year lull. Leasing activity in 2011 that was the strongest since 2007 for all grades of malls and strip centers is expected to get stronger in 2012 not because the consumer has recovered but because retailers are under pressure to grow top line and have devised new strategies and merchandising platforms to take advantage on the ongoing mispricing of space and existing retail/ tenant voids.

If retailers are under pressure to re-grow the top line, there is a greater urgency for landlords to restore occupancy levels where they can dictate rental prices and support debt values of assets that have grown too big for today's shrinking marketplace. In this context, landlords will share in the funding of the speculative new growth of going down market by leasing at terms that makes it affordable for a wider universe of tenants with lower producing store formats.

Not only have old restrictions on uses and co-tenancies that are steadily being abandoned allowing through the door the full spectrum of retail formats to absorb the structural overhang of space, but the High Frequency Leasing (HFL) model of 'robo-renting" model adopted under the past two decades of real estate securitization, ² has the capacity to sign up sub prime tenant credits and formats while earning a premium rent for the risk.

The turnover of junk retail credits and formats generates volume and demand that elevates rental prices. After being temporarily shutdown in the 2008 aftermath, this turbo leasing machine is being ramped back up by the down market spatial expansion of retailers. Here, the volume of leasing will be accommodating many 6-10.

The demand by such users has been growing as many remain in a restructuring mode, turning to new store supply to manufacture a new baseline of value and equity trove to offset troubled store portfolios and elevate stock prices.

The pool of such sub prime tenants will not dry up anytime soon, providing replacements for high turnover. For many landlords, this is a good problem to have since most rent rolls still operate off High Frequency Leasing model.

The speculative growth underscoring the retailer's pipelines is only half the story of any re-risking of the rent roll. Opportunistic landlords in the retail REIT sector (such as Kimco, Vornado and General Growth--spearheaded by an ex-Vornado exec post BK) are launching financing programs for cash-starved retail establishments, be it local operators, small cap chains and franchisees, dislocated by the ongoing credit crunch in the small business sector.

Continues....

² "RoboRenting. Seven-Plus Deadly Signs of Leasing Risk...at the Mall. "[High-Frequency leasing (HFL) the new profit model for mall owners.] *Retail MAXIM*: Mar 2010.

^{1 &}quot;Into Thin Air. Retail Rescued by an Avalanche of New Normal(s)." [Implications for Growth and Real Estate

Chg: bps

2010-2012

(3.19) 4.00

(4.30)

(5.50)

(3.50) (5.80) (9.40) 1.70 (12.00)

5.00

(0.20)

(6.40) (6.00)

(10.00) (7.70)

(0.40)

(1.30) 0.00

(2.80)

(7.00) (4.00)

(3.90)

2005-2012

0.70

5.50

2.00

4.00

(3.70)

8.80

5.10

19.20 (14.50) 4.70

7.50

1.80

3.60

DOWN MARKET Strategies of Retail Credits Aimed at Double-Digit Growth Low to Moderate Productivity Formats: (Less <\$315 PSF)

| MAX-WL Rankings | Index Value | Competitive Advantage Taxonomy |
|-----------------|-------------|---|
| Positive Watch | | |
| Optimal | >25.00 | Industry Standard-Benchmark. Above market growth & returns. Operating advtg. Wide moat. High intrinsic value. Real estate integral to bs & Internet. |
| Competitive | 14.00-24.99 | Competitive-Niche Model. Competitive growth and asset returns. Niche player. Strong brand equity. Leveraging real estate & alternative channels. |
| On-the-Cusp | 10.00-13.99 | Transition Model. Emerging operating & competitive risk. Model, strategies & selling channels being tested by market. Costly integration of M&A & debt. |
| Negative Watch | | |
| Challenged | 4.50-9.99 | Speculative Credit. Second-tier chain. Sub par metrics. Consumer disconnect. Restructuring mode. New concepts/channels tested. Turnover mgmt&stores. |
| Sinkholes | <4.50/-9.99 | Turnaround Credit. Negative growth, returns & leverage investing. Irrelevant shopping experience. Alternative costly funding thru asset sales/ M&A. |

| Bs. Score-Pts | Growth Prospects | Operating Productivity | Profit Model/ Management | Capitalization/ Liquidity | Real Estate Quality & Strategy |
|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Above 18.00 | Above Market Growth. | Sector Benchmark. | Superior Supply Chain & Visionary Mgmt | Self-Funding/ CapitalAdvtg. | Assets Integral to Business Model |
| | Market Risk: Low | Operating Risk: Low | Event Risk: Low | Credit Risk: Low | Asset Risk: Low |
| 10.00-17.99 | Opportunistic Growth. | Viable Niche-Model. | Accretive Model. | Positive Leverage. | Productive Formats. |
| | Market Risk: Moderate | Operating Risk: Moderate | Event Risk: Low | Credit Risk: Moderate | Asset Risk: Moderate |
| 4.50-9.99 pts | Sub par Growth Cycle | Reinventing Model. | Model at Crossroads. | Volatile-Inefficient Structure | Functional Obsolescence |
| | Market Risk: Rising | Operating Risk: Rising | Event Risk: Low | Credit Risk: Low | Asset Risk: Moderate |
| Btwn +4.49 & | Dilutive-Depleted Growth | Impaired Model. Turnaround. | Sinkhole-Busted Supply Chain | Sinkhole-Illiquid. | Turnaround Asset/ Non-integral to Bs |
| Neg-9.99 | Market Risk: High | Operating Risk: High | Event Risk: High | Credit Risk: High | Asset Risk: High |
| Neg 10.00+ | Growth Starved. | Model BrokenBeyond Repair. | Distressed-Liquidation. | Insolvent. | Junk Assets. |
| | Market Risk: Extreme | Operating Risk: Extreme | Event Risk: High | Credit Risk: High | Asset Risk: High |

| | | | | | | | Bs. | | | | | Chg: | | Chg: | | |
|------------|--------|--------------------------|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---|
| Volatility | / | | | G-400 | Avg. | | Value | (pts) | | | Real | bps | | bps | | |
| Chg-bps | | | Fundamental | Value | Value | | Growth | Optg/ | Profit | Liquid/ | Estate | Real | | Growth | | L |
| 2012 | 2012 | | Value Rating | (pts) | (pts) | | Prosp | Prod | Model | Capital | Advtg | Estate | | Pros | | |
| vs. | vs. | | | 2012- | 2007- | 2001- | 2012- | | | | | 2010- | 2005- | 2010- | 2005- | |
| 2007 | 2011 | | 2012 | Feb | 2011 | 2006 | Feb | | | | | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 | |
| 1.54 | (0.17) | Global 400 Composite | POS: On-the-Cusp | 10.16 | 9.20 | 11.78 | 13.05 | 4.57 | 11.39 | 7.68 | 11.52 | 0.75 | 1.19 | (0.54) | (1.28) | ┸ |
| (0.32) | (1.38) | ALCO (former Duckwall) | NEG: Sinkhole | (4.53) | (4.49) | 5.69 | (0.50) | (9.00) | 1.00 | (10.50) | (0.75) | (0.75) | (8.25) | 3.00 | (6.50) | ┸ |
| 17.70 | 1.92 | Bed Bath & Beyond | POS: Optimal | 29.96 | 22.71 | 16.80 | 31.00 | 21.70 | 29.50 | 31.20 | 27.00 | 1.00 | 15.50 | 0.00 | 11.00 | |
| 6.56 | (1.59) | Big Lots | POS: On-the-Cusp | 11.49 | 11.88 | 1.90 | 19.50 | 2.50 | 6.00 | 14.50 | 11.50 | (7.00) | 18.75 | 2.50 | 25.50 | |
| (3.20) | (1.74) | Bon Ton: Elder-Beerman | NEG: Sinkhole | 3.57 | 8.00 | 4.88 | 5.50 | 2.50 | 6.50 | (6.00) | 10.50 | (6.00) | (3.00) | (5.50) | (3.50) | |
| (0.64) | (0.60) | Burlington Coat (Prv) | NEG: Sinkhole | (9.69) | (7.51) | (0.30) | (2.00) | (12.30) | (1.80) | (17.30) | (10.00) | (8.75) | (9.00) | (7.50) | (5.00) | |
| 5.79 | 0.25 | Cableas: Retail | POS: Competitive | 16.12 | 14.60 | 16.79 | 15.20 | 12.60 | 20.10 | 10.70 | 16.70 | 0.20 | 6.20 | 0.70 | (2.80) | |
| 0.64 | (1.91) | Casual Male | NEG: Challenged | 9.06 | 3.35 | 5.22 | 17.00 | 0.20 | 2.20 | 3.30 | 21.98 | 12.73 | 9.98 | 8.50 | (1.00) | |
| 8.74 | 0.57 | Cato | NEG: Challenged | 5.31 | 2.90 | 7.87 | 5.00 | (2.00) | 8.00 | 9.50 | 4.25 | (1.75) | 4.75 | (7.00) | 4.00 | |
| 11.25 | 2.07 | Charming Catherines | NEG: Sinkhole | 1.37 | (5.61) | 5.21 | 5.50 | 3.00 | 4.50 | (7.00) | 0.00 | 6.50 | (6.75) | 8.00 | (3.50) | |
| 7.18 | 1.56 | Charming Lane Bryant | NEG: Challenged | 9.09 | 0.98 | 13.18 | 10.30 | 11.30 | 10.30 | (4.00) | 16.55 | 12.05 | 2.55 | 4.30 | (2.70) | |
| 7.05 | (1.92) | Chicos (core brand) | POS: On-the-Cusp | 12.16 | 6.01 | 16.28 | 16.30 | 3.10 | 8.60 | 14.30 | 15.05 | 7.05 | (8.25) | 11.30 | (4.00) | |
| 0.02 | (1.80) | Citi Trends | NEG: Sinkhole | (8.65) | 1.05 | 11.15 | (4.00) | (11.00) | (1.50) | (15.50) | (8.00) | (17.25) | (27.50) | (14.00) | (24.00) | |
| (13.94) | (1.97) | Coolective/Payless Shoes | NEG: Sinkhole | (9.16) | 2.81 | 2.27 | (1.00) | (9.50) | (7.50) | (11.50) | (12.00) | (7.30) | (5.25) | (10.00) | 0.00 | |
| 13.57 | 2.77 | Cost-Plus | NEG: Challenged | 4.77 | (5.68) | 7.34 | 12.80 | (2.20) | (0.20) | 2.00 | 10.30 | 11.05 | 10.80 | 7.80 | 13.80 | |
| | | Delhaize (Food Lon/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | l | |
| (10.17) | (2.88) | Bottom Dollar/Hannaford) | NEG: Sinkhole | 1.91 | 11.15 | 6.12 | 5.50 | (8.50) | 5.50 | 4.50 | 4.25 | 0.87 | (5.00) | 1.00 | (2.50) | |
| 13.31 | 2.06 | Dollar General | POS: Competitive | 17.77 | 12.99 | 10.16 | 21.50 | 13.10 | 16.00 | 14.00 | 19.75 | 0.75 | 7.75 | 1.00 | 5.50 | |
| 15.55 | 0.18 | Dollar Tree | POS: Optimal | 30.26 | 20.82 | 9.82 | 30.50 | 19.20 | 21.50 | 33.00 | 38.00 | 21.12 | 35.00 | 8.00 | 22.50 | |
| (0.03) | 1.05 | Dress Barn (Ascena) | NEG: Challenged | 9.84 | 9.02 | 6.92 | 15.00 | (1.50) | 9.50 | 9.50 | 14.95 | 3.70 | 12.45 | 2.50 | (1.00) | 1 |
| 10.34 | 1.85 | DSW Shoes | POS: Competitive | 15.91 | 8.28 | 7.26 | 14.50 | 8.70 | 12.00 | 21.00 | 17.75 | 9.50 | 13.46 | (6.50) | 4.17 | 1 |
| 19.31 | (1.01) | Family Dollar | POS: Competitive | 14.30 | 10.50 | 6.63 | 18.00 | 2.50 | 5.50 | 14.50 | 26.95 | 3.70 | 27.95 | (5.00) | 12.00 | |
| (2.62) | 0.00 | Fred's | NEG: Sinkhole | 1.38 | 3.10 | 10.27 | 6.00 | (2.20) | 3.50 | (1.50) | (1.00) | (0.30) | (15.50) | (1.30) | (5.00) | |
| 13.34 | 1.06 | Gap: Old Navy | NEG: Challenged | 5.45 | 2.80 | (1.42) | 9.30 | (3.40) | (1.10) | 11.10 | 9.55 | 1.80 | 13.55 | (6.20) | 1.30 | |

US Consolidated Companies and Divisions (Retail, Wholesale, Direct Marketing) Cycle of Competitive Advantage of Business Model

| Composite Competitive Values: The Global 400 Retail Watch List |
|--|
|--|

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| Negative Watch | | |
| Challenged | 4.50-9.99 | Speculative Credit. Second-tier chain. Sub par metrics. Consumer disconnect. Restructuring mode. New concepts/channels tested. Turnover mgmt&stores. |
| Sinkholes | <4.50/-9.99 | Turnaround Credit. Negative growth, returns & leverage investing. Irrelevant shopping experience. Alternative costly funding thru asset sales/ M&A. |
| Terminal | > (-10.00) | Broken Beyond Repair Model. Insolvent, imminent bankruptcy, liquidation or merger. Zero residual value in bs & assets. |

| | | | Guidance |
|------------|--------|--------|----------|
| Volatility | | | Upside/ |
| Chg-bps | | | Downside |
| 2012 | 2012 | 2012 | 2012- |
| vs. | vs. | vs. | 2013 |
| | | | Chg- |
| 2007 | 2010 | 2011 | bps |
| 1.54 | 0.02 | (0.17) | (0.12) |
| (0.25) | (4.93) | (2.02) | 0.23 |
| (2.91) | (8.02) | (1.68) | (1.60) |
| (3.28) | (5.63) | 0.21 | (0.90) |
| 0.09 | (5.06) | (3.35) | 1.57 |
| | | | |
| 15.22 | (3.86) | (0.98) | 3.38 |
| (5.60) | (7.79) | 0.39 | (3.26) |
| | | | |
| 1.72 | (0.18) | 0.30 | 1.80 |
| (0.77) | (1.60) | 0.49 | (0.90) |
| (0.32) | 2.75 | (1.38) | (5.96) |
| 10.67 | (2.08) | 0.85 | (0.11) |
| (4.29) | 1.89 | (0.11) | 5.40 |
| (17.92) | 4.32 | 3.53 | (3.20) |
| (15.61) | 6.40 | 5.35 | (2.36) |
| | | | |
| (14.79) | 4.78 | 2.43 | (4.95) |
| 7.77 | 7.09 | (0.32) | 2.91 |
| 10.83 | 5.19 | (1.01) | 2.59 |
| 5.66 | 7.83 | (0.05) | 3.04 |
| 2.83 | 1.48 | 0.13 | (0.97) |
| (0.03) | 2.91 | 1.05 | (3.26) |
| 0.94 | (1.51) | 0.07 | 0.79 |
| 10.53 | 1.77 | (0.48) | (0.47) |
| 11.89 | (4.88) | (1.13) | 6.98 |
| 0.38 | (2.45) | (1.45) | (9.56) |
| (2.68) | (1.33) | 0.09 | 2.65 |
| (5.05) | (0.51) | (0.08) | 2.14 |
| 1.63 | (3.05) | 0.52 | 3.60 |

| • | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| • | Fundamental | Outlook |
| • | | |
| | Value Rating | Short-Term |
| | 2012-Feb | 2012-Feb |
| Global 400 Composite | POS: On-the-Cusp | Steady State |
| Abercrombie & Fitch | NEG: Challenged | Steady State |
| Abercrombie (core) | NEG: Challenged | Steady State |
| abercrombie (kids) | NEG: Challenged | Volatile |
| Abercrombie: Hollister | NEG: Challenged | Steady State |
| Abercrombie & Fitch: Int'l | | |
| Advanced Auto Parts | POS: Competitive | Stable |
| Aeropostale | NEG: Challenged | Volatile |
| Ahold (US/Int'I) | | |
| AHO: Giant-Carlisle-US | POS: On-the-Cusp | Steady State |
| Stop & Shop/Giant-Landove | NEG: Challenged | Volatile |
| ALCO (former Duckwall) | NEG: Sinkhole | Volatile |
| AMC Entertainment | NEG: Sinkhole | Volatile |
| American Eagle | POS: On-the-Cusp | Steady State |
| American Apparel (US/Intl) | NEG: Sinkhole | Volatile |
| American Apparel: Retail-US | NEG: Sinkhole | Volatile |
| American Apparel: -Int'l | | |
| Ameri Apparel: Wholesale | NEG: Sinkhole | Volatile |
| ANN Inc (corp) | POS: On-the-Cusp | Steady State |
| Ann Taylor (full price) | POS: On-the-Cusp | Steady State |
| Loft-Ann Taylor | POS: On-the-Cusp | Volatile |
| Ascena | POS: On-the-Cusp | Steady State |
| Dress Barn (Ascena) | NEG: Challenged | Steady State |
| Maurice (Ascena) | POS: Competitive | Stable |
| Justice (tween concept acq) | POS: Competitive | Steady State |
| Auto Zone | POS: Optimal | Stable |
| Baker Footwear Group | NEG: Terminal | Deteriorating |
| Bare Escentuals (corp) | POS: Competitive | Steady State |
| Bare Escenteuals: Retail | POS: Competitive | Steady State |
| Bare Escentuals:Direct Mktg | POS: Competitive | Steady State |
| Bare Escentuals:Int'l | | |

| 0.400 | | |
|---------|----------|---|
| G-400 | | |
| Compos | | |
| Value | | |
| (pts) | | |
| 2012 | 2011 | |
| 10.16 | 10.33 | |
| 9.07 | 11.09 | - |
| 6.94 | 8.62 | - |
| 4.73 | 4.52 | - |
| 9.27 | 12.62 | - |
| J.21 | 12.02 | - |
| 21.51 | 22.49 | |
| 9.83 | 9.44 | - |
| 2.30 | <u> </u> | |
| 13.84 | 13.54 | |
| 4.92 | 4.43 | - |
| (4.53) | (3.15) | |
| 1.93 | 1.08 | |
| 11.73 | 11.84 | |
| (4.26) | (7.79) | |
| (0.97) | (6.32) | |
| | | |
| (5.03) | (7.46) | |
| 11.46 | 11.78 | |
| 13.18 | 14.19 | |
| 10.79 | 10.84 | |
| 13.86 | 13.73 | |
| 9.84 | 8.79 | |
| 14.14 | 14.07 | |
| 16.48 | 16.96 | |
| 28.47 | 29.60 | |
| (12.48) | (11.03) | |
| 15.31 | 15.22 | |
| 14.09 | 14.17 | |
| 18.16 | 17.64 | |
| | | |

| Avg. | | |
|--------------|-------|--------|
| Value | | |
| (pts) | | |
| 2007- | 2001- | 1998- |
| 2011 | 2006 | 2000 |
| 920 | 11.78 | 15.86 |
| 10.04 | 14.12 | 27.19 |
| 10.21 | 14.37 | 27.19 |
| 7.45 | 14.05 | NA |
| 9.99 | 12.90 | NA |
| | | |
| 18.00 | 6.27 | NA |
| 16.60 | 15.12 | 14.32 |
| | | |
| 13.51 | 6.45 | 13.20 |
| 6.62 | 5.95 | 15.57 |
| (4.49) | 5.69 | 6.74 |
| 0.03 | 1.67 | (1.46) |
| 12.34 | 22.40 | 26.49 |
| 1.49 | 15.82 | NA |
| 3.71 | 17.38 | NA |
| | | |
| 0.25 | 14.44 | NA |
| 0.25 1.22 | 6.62 | 19.89 |
| (0.70) | 4.19 | 19.26 |
| 2.82 | 13.71 | 25.18 |
| 11.17 | 7.30 | 12.98 |
| 9.02 | 6.92 | 12.98 |
| 14.12 | 14.68 | NA |
| 7.37 | 14.05 | 22.17 |
| 29.19 | 12.47 | 13.76 |
| (6.12) | 5.03 | NA |
| 16.50 | 24.23 | NA |
| 16.13 | 17.93 | NA |
| 18.80 | 26.88 | NA |
| | | |

| | | _ | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------------------|
| | | | Inflection Point |
| 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2005 |
| 10.14 | 10.09 | 6.80 | 11.57 |
| 14.00 | 7.43 | 8.37 | 15.20 |
| 14.96 | 7.49 | 10.12 | 16.73 |
| 10.36 | 6.09 | 8.26 | 14.37 |
| 14.33 | 7.37 | 6.43 | 12.57 |
| | | | |
| 25.37 | 18.27 | 17.59 | 8.34 |
| 17.62 | 20.64 | 19.85 | 14.58 |
| | | | |
| 14.02 | 13.69 | 14.20 | 6.24 |
| 6.52 | 9.70 | 6.78 | 4.69 |
| (7.28) | (2.03) | (5.78) | 6.74 |
| 4.01 | 3.03 | 0.78 | (0.97) |
| 9.84 | 10.56 | 13.43 | 23.69 |
| (8.58) | (2.26) | 12.41 | 15.86 |
| (7.37) | 0.05 | 17.55 | 18.66 |
| | | | |
| (9.81) | (1.96) | 10.72 | 14.09 |
| 4.37 | (2.41) | (11.33) | 1.28 |
| 7.99 | (13.18) | (14.85) | (4.91) |
| 2.96 | 3.24 | (8.07) | 8.86 |
| 12.38 | 8.95 | 9.74 | 8.49 |
| 6.93 | 11.23 | 8.26 | 8.49 |
| 15.65 | 15.57 | 12.09 | NA |
| 14.71 | 3.35 | (4.12) | 14.55 |
| 33.35 | 36.68 | 29.76 | 5.56 |
| (10.03) | 0.21 | 3.10 | 9.51 |
| 16.64 | 16.77 | 15.88 | 24.41 |
| 14.60 | 15.25 | 17.47 | 17.89 |
| | | | |

21.21

21.59

17.04

27.20

Business Component Values: Global 400 Retail Watch List

| Bs. Score | Growth Prospects | Operating Productivity | Profit Model/ Management | Capitalization/Liquidity | Real Estate Quality & Strategy |
|------------------|--|--|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| Greater >18.00 | Above Market Growth. | Sector Benchmark. | Superior Supply Chain & Visionary | Self-Funding/ High-Yielding Capital | Assets Integral to Business Model. |
| pts | Internal & external growth | Strong merchandising platform. Top | <u>Management</u> | Structure. | Highly productive, state-ofart store formats. |
| | outperforms historiica;I trendd & | logistics & unique supplier network. | Optimal, sustainable model & supply | High free cash flow & asset returns | lintegrated w/ Direct Mktg. catalogs & |
| | sector. | Wide moat. | chain. | vs low capital costs | Internet). |
| | Market Risk: Low | Operating Risk: Low | Event Risk: Low | Credit Risk: Low | Asset Risk: Low |
| 10.00-17.99 | Opportunistic Growth. | Viable Niche-Model. Evolving | Accretive Model. | Positive Leverage. | Productive Formats. |
| | Ample growth opportunities at on bs | merchandise /brand. Competitive | Fair mgmt & board. Relatively efficient | Efficient capital structure. Some | Nominal obsolescence. Strong sites & fair |
| | model & store format. | benchmarks. Narrow eco moat | supply chain. | erosion in asset returns. | residual values. |
| | Market Risk: Moderate | Operating Risk: Moderate | Event Risk: Low | Credit Risk: Moderate | Asset Risk: Moderate |
| 4.50-9.99 pts | Sub par Growth Cycle | Reinventing Model. | Model at Crossroads. | Volatile-Inefficient Structure | Functional Obsolescence |
| | Mature cycle, Requires new growth | Transitional stage. Margin compression, | Model viability being tested: On verge | Dependent on alternative capital | Declining productivity (sales psf). |
| | strategies & bs model, to lower rising | rising costs, eroding purchasing power. | of becoming/ declining. | raising to fund cash flow | Repositioning of portfolio & new format |
| | cost of growth. | Zero moat. | Event Risk: Low | shortfalls—bs/asset sales. | critical to restoring co. |
| | Market Risk: Rising | Operating Risk: Rising | | Credit Risk: Low | Asset Risk: Moderate |
| Between +4.49 & | Dilutive-Depleted Growth | Impaired Model. Turnaround. | Sinkhole-Busted Supply Chain | Sinkhole-Illiquid. | Turnaround Assets/ |
| minus-9.99 | Expansion opportunities iimited. | Shopping experience irrelevant. Sharply | Recapitalization can't stem profit | Negative leverage, capital returns | Non-integral to Business. |
| | Needs new growth vehicle or bs | eroding margins & rising costs. Zero eco | erosion. Supply chain inefficient. | & rental cvg. Asset sales & store | High functional obsolescence & poor |
| | model. | moat. | Requires new management. | closings high. | locations lower residual value. |
| | Market Risk: High | Operating Risk: High | Event Risk: High | Credit Risk: High | Asset Risk: High |
| Negative 10.00 & | Growth Starved. | Model BrokenBeyond Repair. | <u>Distressed-Liquidation.</u> | Insolvent. | Junk Assets. |
| Beyond | Zero prospects outside of corp sale | Zero going-concern value. Channel | Bankruptcy specter & mgmt turnover. | Value in breakup of company & | Marginal residual value. Channel dislocation |
| | Downsizing store portfolio. | disintermediation. | Inefficient supply chain. | assets. Negative rental cvg. | & disintermediation. |
| | Market Risk: Extreme | Operating Risk: Extreme | Event Risk: High | Credit Risk: High | Asset Risk: High |
| 1 | | | | | |

| | G-400 | Bs. Value | (points) | | | Real | Cl | hg: os | | Chg: ops | | Chg: bps | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------|----------------|--------|-----|-----------|---------|-------------|---------|-------------|--------------------|-----|
| | Composite | Growth | Operating/ | Profit | Liquidity/ | Estate | | Real | | Growth | | Opto | 1 / | 1 |
| | (points) | Prospects | Productivity | Model | Capitalization | Advtg | Е | state | | Prosp | | Pro | t | l l |
| | 2012- | 2012- | | | | | 2 | 010- | 2005- | 2010- | 2005- | 2010 | 2005- | |
| | Feb | Feb | | | | | 2 | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 | 201 | 2012 | |
| lobal 400 Composite | 10.16 | 13.05 | 4.57 | 11.39 | 7.68 | 11.52 | | 0.75 | 1.19 | (0.54) | (1.28) | (3.19 | (4.61) | |
| percrombie & Fitch | 9.07 | 6.60 | 3.84 | 6.90 | 9.80 | 16.34 | | 1.43 | (2.25) | (9.83) | (15.18) | (9.0 | (9.30) | |
| Abercrombie (core) | 6.94 | 1.90 | 4.30 | 5.60 | 9.20 | 12.65 | _ (| 1.60) | (6.85) | (14.60) | (19.10) | (12.7 | (10.20) | |
| abercrombie (kids) | 4.73 | 1.00 | 2.80 | 4.20 | 8.20 | 7.00 | (| 1.03) | (8.00) | (11.00) | (23.00) | (6.70 | (12.20) |] [|
| Abercrombie: Hollister | 9.27 | 7.00 | 1.40 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 14.50 | | 0.00 | (3.00) | (11.00) | (14.00) | (11.6 | 0) (8.60) | |
| Abercrombie & Fitch: Int'l | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ivanced Auto Parts | 21.51 | 24.00 | 10.00 | 17.00 | 25.00 | 26.50 | (| 1.00) | 17.00 | (9.00) | 13.00 | (12.5 | 0) 6.00 | |
| ropostale | 9.83 | 8.50 | 2.30 | 12.00 | 12.50 | 11.25 | (1 | (3.25) | 2.25 | (2.50) | (15.50) | (12.7 | (0) (11.70) | |
| hold (US/Int'l) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| AHO: Giant-Carlisle-US | 13.84 | 17.70 | 9.20 | 18.70 | 7.50 | 14.20 | | 3.20 | 10.20 | 6.70 | 15.70 | 2.70 | 0.20 | |
| Stop & Shop/Giant-Landover | 4.92 | 8.00 | (3.00) | 14.00 | 2.20 | 3.80 | (| 1.40) | 1.30 | (2.50) | 3.00 | (3.00 | (13.00) | |
| LCO (former Duckwall) | (4.53) | (0.50) | (9.00) | 1.00 | (10.50) | (0.75) | (| 0.75) | (8.25) | 3.00 | (6.50) | 4.00 | (15.00) | |
| MC Entertainment | 1.93 | 8.00 | (0.50) | 4.00 | (2.50) | 0.75 | | 4.00 | (0.75) | (3.50) | 2.00 | (10.5 | 0) 1.50 | |
| merican Eagle | 11.73 | 10.00 | 7.70 | 13.70 | 10.70 | 13.50 | | 1.50 | (2.50) | 0.00 | (16.00) | 1.20 | (13.30) | |
| merican Apparel (US & Intl) | (4.26) | 4.00 | 2.60 | (4.20) | (20.09) | (0.86) | | 2.73 | (17.66) | 10.50 | (19.50) | 5.80 | (11.45) | |
| American Apparel: Retail-US | (0.97) | 9.00 | 7.50 | (3.50) | (18.50) | 2.85 | | 4.00 | (15.90) | 13.00 | (19.00) | 11.0 | 0 (12.50) | |
| American Apparel -Int'l | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| American Apparel: Wholesale | (5.03) | (2.00) | 3.50 | (1.50) | (20.00) | (2.00) | | 4.00 | (17.75) | 7.50 | (21.00) | 8.50 | (8.50) | |
| NN Inc (corp) | 11.46 | 13.23 | 2.79 | 9.21 | 10.46 | 17.44 | 1 | 14.69 | 26.52 | 9.63 | 14.55 | 0.3 | 11.67 | |
| Ann Taylor (full price) | 13.18 | 12.80 | 2.50 | 10.00 | 14.20 | 22.05 | | 15.30 | 33.05 | 4.30 | 15.80 | (7.00 | | |
| Loft-Ann Taylor | 10.79 | 13.40 | 2.90 | 8.90 | 9.00 | 15.65 | 1 | 4.45 | 2.65 | 11.70 | (4.60) | 3.20 | (1.10) | |

COVERAGE

Global 400 Retail Watch List

| Abercrombie & Fitch (US & Intl) | Cost-Plus | Kirklands | Sally Beauty Supply-Retail |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Abercrombie: Abercrombie (core) | Cracker Barrel | Kohl's | Sally Beauty Systams Group: Wholesale/Franchises |
| Abercrombie: abercrombie (kids) | Crocs (US& Int'l) | Krispy Kreme | Sears (US & Intl) |
| Abercrombie: Hollister | Crocs: Retail | Kroger | Sears: US Dept. Stores |
| Abercrombie & Fitch: Int'l | Crocs: Wholesale | L'Occitaine | Sears: Kmart Stores |
| Advanced Auto Parts | CVS | La-Z-Boy (corp) | Sears: Great Indoors |
| Aeropostale | CVS: Core Retail Division | La-Z-Boy: Retail | Sears: Canada Dpt Stores |
| Ahold (US/Int'l) | CVS: Longs Division | La-Z-Boy: Upholstery/Services | Sleep Number (Select Comfort) |
| AHO: Giant-Carlisle-US | CVS: Carremark Division | La-Z-Boy: Wholesale/Corp | Sharper Image: Direct Mktg/ E-Com |
| AHO: Stop & Shop/Giant-Landover-US | Darden | Life Time Fitness | Shoe Carnival |
| ALCO (former Duckwall) | Delhaize America (Food Lon/ Bottom Dollar/Hannaford) | Limited Brands (US & Intl) | Signet Jeweler (US & Int'l) |
| AMC Entertainment | Denny's Corp | Limited: Bath & Body Works | Signet Jeweler (Kay/ Jared) |
| American Eagle | Design Within Reach | Limited-Victoria Secrets | Signet: Int'l Euro |
| American Apparel (US & Intl) | Destination Maternity | Limited-La Sensza (Canada) | Skechers (US & Intl) |
| American Apparel: Retail-US | Dick's Sporting (corp) | Lowes | Skechers: Retail-US |
| American Apparel: Retail-Int'l | Dick's Sporting Superstore | Luby's/ Foodruckers | Skechers: Wholesale-US |
| American Apparel: Wholesale | Dick's Sporting: Golf Galaxy | Lululemon | Skechers: Int'l Euro/Canada |
| ANN Inc (corp) | Dillard | Luxottica (US & Intl) | Sonic Drive-In |
| Ann Taylor (full price) | Dine Equity (corp) | Luxottica: Retail (Sunglass Hut, Pearle) | Sparten Supermarkets |
| Loft-Ann Taylor | Dine: IHOP | Luxottica: Wholesale | Sports Chalet |
| Apple Retail Store | Dine: Applebees | Luxottica: Int'l | Stage Stores (Bealls) |
| Ascena (Dress Barn/ Maurrice/Justice) | Dollar General | LVMH Fashion Apparel (US & Intl) | Staples (US & Intl) |
| Dress Barn (Ascena) | Dollar Tree | LVMH: Bulgari (US & Intl) (acq 2011) | Staples Superstore (US) |
| Maurice (Ascena) | DSW Shoes | Macy's, Inc (corp) | Staples: Bs Services |
| Justice (tween concept acq) | Dunkin' Dougnuts (US & Int'I) | Macy's: Bloomingdales | Staples: Int'l |
| Asensa: Catherines | Dunkin' Dougnuts | Macy's (former May Co stores) | Starbucks (US & Intl) |
| Asensa: Fashion Bug | Baskin Robbin | Macy's-Marshall Fields | Starbucks Retail-US |
| Asensa: Lane Bryant | Dunkin Intl | Mattress Firm | Starbucks Global Consumer Products Group/ Licensing |
| Auto Zone | Eddie Bauer (private) | McDonalds (US & Intl) | Starbucks Retail/Licensing (Intl) |
| Baker Footwear Group | Estee Lauder (US & Int'l) | McDonalds-US | Stein Mart |
| Bare Escentuals/ Shiesedo (corp) | Estee Lauder (US-Retail & Wholesale) | McDonalds-Int'l-Asia | Steve Madden (corp) |
| Bare Escenteuals: Retail | Estee Lauder: Int'l Euro/Middle East | McDonalds-Int'l-Canada | Steve Madden: Retail |
| Bare Escentuals:Direct Mktg | Estee Lauder: Int'l Asia/Pacific | McDonalds-Int'l-Euro | Steve Madden: Wholesale |
| Bare Escentuals:Int'l | Ethan Allen (corp) | McDonalds-Int'l-So America | SuperValu (corp) |
| Barnes & Noble (corp) | Ethan Allen: Retail | Men's Wearhouse (US & Int'l) | SuperValu: Conventional Spmkt (Albertson/Shaws) |
| Barnesandnoble.com | Ethan Allen:Wholesale | Men's Wearhouse: Core Brand | SuperValu: Sav-A-Lot (Ltd Assort Format) |
| Barnes & Noble: Superstore | Express (Private) | Men's Wearhouse: KG (value) | SuperValu: Wholesale Operations |
| Barney's NY & Co-Op (Private) | Family Dollar | Men's Wearhouse: Int'l (Moore's Canada) | Talbot's (corp) |
| bebe | Fiesta Restaurant Group | Michael's (Private) | Talbots: Retail (Core Brand) |
| Bed Bath & Beyond | Fiesta: Pollo Tropical | Michael Kors (US & Int'l) | Talbots: Direct Mktg/E-Com |
| Belks Dept Store (corp) | Fiesta: Taco Cabana | Michael Kors: Retail | Target (US & Int'l) |
| Belks (core division) | Fiesta: Burger King Franchises | Michael Kors: Wholesale | Target (Discount Store) |
| Belks Regional Dept Stores | Fifth & Pacific (formerly Liz Claiborne) | Michael Kors: Licensing | Target (Supercenters) |
| Best Buy (US & Intl) | Fifth & Pacific:Juicy Couture | Morton's Restaurant | Teavanna |
| Best Buy Superstore (US) | Fifth & Pacific: Lucky Brands | Mulberry (US & Int'l) | Tesco (US & Intl) |
| Best Buy: Future Shops (Canada) | Fifth & Pacific: Kate Spade Jack Spade | Nash Finch | Tesco: Asia (Supercenter/C-Stores |
| Best Buy: Five Stars (China) | Finish Line | Neiman Marcus (Private) | Tesco:Europe (Supercentre/Supermarket) |
| Big 5 Sporting Goods | Five Below | Neiman Marcus: Retail | Tesco:UK (Supercenter) |
| Big Lots | Florsheim (Weyco Group-Retail Shoes) | Neiman Marcus Direct Mktg/E-Com | Tesco: US |
| BJ's | Foot Locker (US & Intl) | New York & Company | The Fresh Market |

Retail MAXIM: Alternative Retail Risk Analysis for Alternative Capital

SAMPLE ISSUE

| Blockbuster Video (US & Intl) | Foot Locker:E-Commerce | Nike (US & Intl) | Tiffany (US & Intl) |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Blockbuster Video: US | Foot Locker: Retail-US | Nike: US (Retail & Wholesale) | Tiffany: US |
| Blockbuster Video: Int'l | Foot Locker: Int'l | Nike : Int'll-Asia | Tiffany: Direct Mktg |
| Bob Evans (corp) | Fossil (US & Intl) | Nike: Int'l-Euro/Mid East | Tiffany: Int'l |
| Bob Evans: Retail | Fossil: Retail-US | Nike: Int'l-Latin America | Tilley's |
| Bob Evans: Wholesale | Fossil: Wholesale/Internet | Ninety Cents Only | Tim Horton (US & Int'l) |
| Body Central | Fossil: Int'l-Asia | Nordstrom's (corp) | Tim Horton: US |
| Bon Ton (corp) | Fossil: Int'l-Euro | Nordstrom's: Full Price Specialty Store | Tim Horton: International |
| Bon Ton Dept Stores/Saks | Francesca's Collection | Nordstrom's: Rack (off-price) | TJX (US & Intl) |
| Bon Ton: Elder-Beerman | Fred's | Office Depot (US & Intl) | TJX/Marshalls |
| Books-A-Million | Frederick's of Hollywood | Office Depot Superstore | TJX: Home Goods |
| Brinker Intl | Furniture Brands (Thomasville) | Office Depot: Bs Services | TJX: Canada-Winners/Home Sense |
| Brookstone (Private) | G-III (US & Int'l) (Wilson's Leather/ KCP/ Cole Hahn/ Sean John/ Hilfiger/ C Klein/ Guess) | Office Depot: Int'l | TJX: UK-TK Maxx |
| Brown Group (corp) | G-III Retail/ Factory Outlets | Office MAX (corp) | Tod's Group SPA (US & Intl) |
| Brown Group: Retail Shoes | G-III Wholesale/ Licesning | Office MAX: US | Tommy Bahamas (Oxford Industries) |
| Brown Group: Wholesale | G-III Int'l | Office MAX: Bs Services | Town Sports (NY Sports/ Boston Sports/ etc) |
| Buckle | Gamestop (US & Intl) | O'Reilly's (corp) | Toys-R-Us (US & Intl) |
| Build-A-Bear (US & Intl) | Gamestop: US | O'Reilly's: Core Brand | Toys-R-Us/ FAO Schwartz |
| Build-A-Bear: US | Gamestop: Int'l | O'Reilly: CSK Auto (conversion) | Toys-R-Us: Int'l |
| Build-A-Bear: Int'l | Gander Mountain (Private) | Orchard Supplies (Sears subsidiary) | Transworld Entertainment |
| Burberry (US & Intl) | Gap (US & Intl) | Pacific Sunwear | True Religion (US & Intl) |
| Burger King (US & Intl) | Gap: Gap/Kid's/Gap Body | Panerra Bread | True Religion: Wholesale/Direct Mktg |
| Burger King: US | Gap: GapKids | Papa Johns (US & Intl) | True Religion: Retail |
| Burger King: Int'l | Gap: Banana Republic | Papa Johns: US | True Religion: Int'l |
| Burlington Coat (Private) | Gap: Old Navy | Pappa John's: Int'l | Tuesday Morning |
| Cabelas (corp) | Gap: Int'l | Pep Boys | Tumi (US & Int'l) |
| Cableas: Retail | Genesco (corp) | Perfumania (Retail & Wholesale) | Tumi Retail |
| Cableas: Direct Mktg/E-Com | Genesco: Hat World | Perfumania: Retail | Tumi Wholesale |
| Cabelas: Financial Services/Other | Genesco: Johnston & Murphy | Perfumania: Wholesale | Tumi-Retail Int'l |
| Cache | Genesco: Journey | PETsMART | Tumi Wholesale Int'l |
| California Pizza | Genesco: Licensed & Other | PF Changs | Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance |
| Carmike Cinema | Giorgio Armani (US & Intl) (Private) | Pier One | United Retail [Avenue] (Private) (Chpt 11) |
| Carter Kids | GNC Nutrition (US & Int'l) (Private) | Polo Ralph Lauren (US & Intl) | Under Armour |
| Carter Kids: Retail | GNC Nutrition-US | Polo Ralph Lauren: Retail | Urban Outfitters (corp) |
| Osh Gosh B'Gosh: Retail | GNC Nutrition: Int'l | Polo Ralph Lauren: Wholesale | Urban Outfitters: Anthropologie-Retail |
| Carter/Osh Gosh : Wholesale | Gordmans | Polo Ralph Lauren: Int'l (Euro/Asia) | Urban Outfitters: Core Brand-Retail |
| Casual Male | Great A&P (corp) | PPR (Gucci Group/Puma) | Urban Outfitters:Free People/Terrain/Wholesale |
| Cato | Gr A&P | Gucci Grp (Gucci/ Bottega-V/YSL) | VF Corp: Wholesale & Retail (US & Intl) |
| CEC Entertainment | Gr A&P: Pathmark | Gucci Brand | VFC: Outdoor (North Face/Reef/Jansport) |
| Charlotte Russe | Guess (US & Intl) | Puma (PPR-Gucci) | VFC: Sportswear (Nautica/Kipplinger/Eagle Creek) |
| Cheesecake Factory | Guess: Retail | Prada (US & Int'l) | VFC: Contemporary (Lucy/7 for Mankind |
| Chicos (corp) | Guess: Wholesale | Publix | Vera Bradley |
| Chicos: Chicos (core brand) | Guess: Int'l | PVH (Retail & Wholesale) | Vitamin Shoppes (US & Int'l) |
| Chicos: White House/Black Market | Guitar Center (Private) | PVH: Tommy Hilfiger & Calvin Klein: Retail | Walgreen |
| Children's Place (US & Intl) | Gymboree | PVH Brands: Wholesale | Walking Company-The |
| Children's Place: US | Hancock Fabrics | Quiksilver (US & Intl) | Walmart (US & Intl) |
| Children's Place: Int'l | Harris Teeter | Quiksilver: Retail (Board Sports) | Walmart: Supercenter Format |
| Chipolte Mexican Grill | Hastings Entertainment | Quiksilver: Wholesale (Boarding Sports) | Walmart: Discount Format |
| Christopher & Banks | Haverty | Quiksilver: US & Americas | Walmart: Sam's Club |
| Cinemark (US & Intl) | Hennes & Mauritz (US & Intl) | Quiksilver: Asia | Walmart: Neighborhood Market |
| Citi Trends | Hennes & Mauritz: US | Quiksilver: Europe | Walmart: Int'l |
| CKE Restaurants (Private) | Hennes & Mauritz: Int'l | Radio Shack | Weis Markets |
| Claire's (US & Intl) | Hermes (US & Intl) | Regal Cinema | Wendy's |
| Claire's: US | hhgregg | REI (sports/adventure) | West Marine |

SAMPLE ISSUE

| Claire's: Int'l | Hibbetts | Regis Hair Salons (US & Int'l) | Wet Seal (corp) |
|---|---|--|--------------------------------------|
| | | Regis Salons (US) [Regis/ Mastercuts/ | |
| Coach Leather (US & Intl) | Home Depot (US & Intl) | Supercuts/Promenade] | Wet Seal (core) |
| Coach Retail-Full Price US | Hot Topic | Regis Hair Restoration Salons (US) | B. Arden (Wet Seal) |
| Coach Retail-Factory Outlet-US | Ingles Mkt | Regis Hair Salons (Int'I) | Whole Foods |
| Coach Whoelsale- US | J. Crew (J Crew/Crew Cuts/ Madewell) | Rent-A-Center | Williams Sonoma (corp) |
| Coach Leather-Int'l | Jack-in-the-Box | Restoration Hardware (Private) | Williams Sonoma: Pottery Barn |
| Coldwater Creek (corp) | JC Penney (corp) | Restoration Hardware: Retail | Williams Sonoma: Pottery B.Kids |
| Coldwater Creek: Retail | JC Penney: Retail-US | Restoration Hardware:Direct Mktg/E-Com | Williams Sonoma: Studio |
| Coldwater Creek: Direct Mktg/E-Com | JC Penney: Direct Mktg/Internet | Richmont-Compagnie Financiere (US & Int'l) | Williams Sonoma: West Elm |
| Collective Brands (US & Intl) | Jo-Ann Stores | Rite Aid (corp) | Williams Sonoma:Direct Mktg/ E-Com |
| Collective Brands/Payless Shoes: US | Joe's Jeans | Rite Aid: Core | Winn-Dixie (Merged w/ Bi-Lo 2012-Q1) |
| Collective Brands: Stride Rite: Retail | Jones Apparel Group (corp) | Rit Aid: Brooks | Yankee Candle (Private) |
| Collective Brands: Stride Rite: Wholesale | Jones Apparel:Nine West (Full price & FOC) | Rite Aid: Eckerd | YUM! Brands (US& Intl) |
| Collective Brands: Int'l | Jones Apparel: Wholesale Apparel & Shoes (Dept Stores) | Ross | YUM! Brands: US |
| Conn's Appliances | Jones Apparel: Specialty (Full price & FOC) | Rue 21 | YUM! Brands: GC |
| Cosi | Jos. A Banks | Ruby Tuesdays | YUM! Brands: Int'l-Non Asia |
| Costco (US & Intl) | Kenneth Cole (corp) | Safeway | Zales |
| Costco: U.S. | Kenneth Cole: Retail (Full price & FOC) | Saks Fifth Avenue | ZaraInditex (US & Intl) |
| Costco: Int'l | Kenneth Cole: Wholesale & Licensing | Sally Beauty Supply Holdings (corp) | Zara-US |
| | | | Zara (all brands) Int'l |
| | | | Zumiez |

MAX-WL Index of Fundamental Values

Valuation & Scoring

Composite Values: Composite Fundamental Values for each retailer are ranked by Positive Watch and Negative Watch. (See table below for value scores and taxonomy.) Credit quality is further scored by degree of competitiveness of the business model, supply chain, real estate assets/selling channel and management. The composite grading reveals assumptions about degrees of risk and solvency, potential growth prospects, expected investment returns, capital spreads and intrinsic business and real estate values. To determine sources of strength and weakness in the business model, see business component values on following pages broken out by five fundamental pillars of value: Growth, operating-merchandising, profit model & management, capital structure & liquidity and real estate portfolio quality and alternative selling/distribution channels (wholesale, direct marketing—catalogs Internet).

| MAX-WL Rankings | Index Value | Competitive Advantage Taxonomy |
|-----------------|-------------|---|
| Positive Watch | | |
| Optimal | >25.00 | Industry Standard-Benchmark. Above market growth & returns. Operating advtg. Wide moat. High intrinsic value. Real estate integral to bs & Internet. |
| Competitive | 14.00-24.99 | Competitive-Niche Model. Competitive growth and asset returns. Niche player. Strong brand equity. Leveraging real estate & alternative channels. |
| On-the-Cusp | 10.00-13.99 | Transition Model. Emerging operating & competitive risk. Model, strategies & selling channels being tested by market. Costly integration of M&A & debt. |
| Negative Watch | | |
| Challenged | 4.50-9.99 | Speculative Credit. Second-tier chain, Sub par metrics. Consumer disconnect. Restructuring mode. New concepts tested. Turnover mgmt&stores. |
| Sinkholes | <4.50/-9.99 | Turnaround Credit. Negative growth, returns & leverage investing. Irrelevant shopping experience. Alternative costly funding thru asset sales/ M&A. |
| Terminal | > (-10.00) | Broken Beyond Repair Model. Insolvent, imminent bankruptcy, liquidation or merger. Zero residual value in bs & assets. |

Credit quality ranking purport to be bond rating equivalents, but not perfect substitutes because conventional bond cash flow valuations are expanded to include asset valuation (real estate, brands, intellectual Internet property) and structural assessments of supply chains & logistics. Also assessed are merchandising and real estate strategies to determine relevancy to core and prospective customers. Positive Watch credits-Optimal and Competitive can be viewed as investment grade (A-rated), On-the-Cusp as triple-B equivalent. Negative Watch Credits include Challenged credits with bond rating equivalents of double/single-B ratings, Sinkholes are speculative or high-yield credits (single B-and CCC) and Terminal are junk or non-rated issues.

Loss severity is measured by year-over-year change in composite values, reflecting recovering situations, weakening credits or deteriorating credits at risk of bankruptcy or liquidation. (See below.)

Risk-Reward Value Spectrum Credit Watch Negative Negative Negative Positive Positive Positive Credit Quality Terminal Sinkhole Challenged On-the-Cusp Competitive Optimal MAX-WL Value -10.00+ 4.50 to -9.99 4.50 to 9.99 10.00 to 13.99 14.00-24.99 25.00+ Bond Rating Equivalent D/Non-rated B-/CCC BB+/B BBB+/BBB-AA/A AAA/AA Degree of Risk Extreme High High Moderate Low Low Subpar performance Investment Profile & Expectations Distressed/insolvent Speculative Stable fundamentals Steady state Optimal performance (Cash flows, default probability, recovery rate, Bankruptcy, liquidation or Imminent bankruptcy or Volatility in cash flows, Transitional business model. Competitive operating models Benchmarks for sector—growth asset values) M&A merger returns/ management Downside risk & returns Intrinsic Value Zero Low Nominal Nominal High High Recovery Value/Rate Negative Low Low Moderate High High Positive Spread Investing Dilutive Negative Positive Self-funding Self-funding Negative Solvency Distressed Speculative Eroding Eroding Stable Stable Recession Beta High Moderate Moderate High High High Growth Prospects Zero Declinina Limited Low-Moderate Moderate High Investment Returns Negative Declining Volatile-High Flat-Moderate Stable Competitive Capital Spreads (quality) High-Yield Speculative Investment grade Junk Speculative Investment grade Real Estate Dilutive/ Marginal/obsolescence Secondary/ Secondary/moderate Vital/integral/ growth Vital/ integral/ benchmark (Integral to Operating Model) obsolescence obsolescence productivity potential

MAX-WL Index of Fundamental Values

Business Component Values

Business Component Values are "notched" for various levels of risk systemic to the company, sector and market (consumer and financial). Weighs impact of macro-economic events (recession, asset deflation, credit crunch), management's ability to innovate, grow, leverage costs, efficiently capitalize & compete. Severity of Risk Score: Market Risk see Growth Prospects, Operating Risk see Operating & Productivity, Event Risk see Profit Model, Credit Risk see Capitalization & Liquidity, Asset Risk see Real Estate Quality.

| | Scoring by Business Component: Risk-Reward | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Bs. Score | Growth Prospects | Operating Productivity | Profit Model/ Management | Capitalization/Liquidity | Real Estate Quality & Strategy | | | | | | |
| Greater >18.00 pts | Above Market Growth. Internal & external growth outperforms historical trends & sector. Ample store capacity, market & format opportunities. New alliances (vendors, direct marketing & Internet). M&A + organic growth. Market Risk: Low | Sector Benchmark. Strong merchandising platform. Great operating leverage & purchasing power. Top logistics & unique supplier network. Dominant brand & formats. Wide moat. Operating Risk: Low | Superior Supply Chain & Visionary Management Optimal & sustainable profit model and supply chain. Strong mgmt & board. Strong competitive advantage from irreplaceable model & assets. Event Risk: Low | Self-Funding/ High-Yielding Capital Structure. Free cash flow strong. Low capital costs & high asset returns. Equity values underpin high franchise value & liquidity. Credit Risk: Low | Assets Integral to Business Model. Highly productive and state-of-the-art store formats. Stores integrated w/ Direct Marketing (catalogs & Internet). Dominant sites with high residual value. Steady cap ex allocations sustains asset value & competitiveness. Asset Risk: Low | | | | | | |
| 10.00-17.99 | Opportunistic Growth. Ample growth opportunities at a price based on bs model & store format. Experimentation w/ new formats & bs alliances great to jumpstart slowing core growth. M&A dependent. Market Risk: Moderate | Viable Niche-Model. Evolving merchandise mix & brand equity. Competitive margins & productivity benchmarks. Wide moat: Competitive risk moderate. Operating Risk: Moderate | Accretive Model. Fair mgmt & board. Relatively efficient supply chain & vendor alliances, requiring modicum of upgrading. Accretive profit growth & few write offs. Sound inventory mgmt & turns. Event Risk: Low | Positive Leverage. Not fully-self-funding yet capital structure efficient & cost of capital competitive. Strong free cash flow position & liquidity coverage. Slight erosion in asset returns. Credit Risk: Moderate | Productive Formats. Nominal obsolescence. Strong sites & fair residual values. Formats & locations still relatively to bs model & customer. Cap ex invested in new & remodels to sustain asset productivity. Asset Risk: Moderate | | | | | | |
| 4.50-9.99 pts | Sub par Growth Cycle Mature cycle. Growing competition. Volatile internal growth. Limited store capacity. Requires new growth strategies, bs model, selling channels & mgmt to lower rising cost of growth. M&A dependent. Market Risk: Rising | Reinventing Model. Merchandising platform losing advtg w/ consumer. Transitional stage of bs to adapt to new competitive environment. Margin compression, rising costs, eroding purchasing power & brand equity. Zero moat. Operating Risk: Rising | Model at Crossroads. Viability of model being tested: On the verge of becoming and/or declining. Volatile earnings due to poor mgmt, overexpansion, new competition or margin erosion. Significant writeoffs. Event Risk: Low | Volatile-Inefficient Structure Dependent on alternative capital raising to fund cash flow shortfalls, including bs & asset sales Limited borrowing capacity, trade-offs with capital cost & returns. Volatile equity values. Credit Risk: Low | Functional Obsolescence Declining productivity (sales psf). Trading down in new locations. Need for remodeling as obsolescence increases. High cap ex maintenance. Repositioning of portfolio & new format critical to restoring co. Asset Risk: Moderate | | | | | | |
| Between +4.49 & minus-9.99 | Dilutive-Depleted Growth Expansion opportunities limited. External & internal growth in secular decline. Needs new growth vehicle or bs model. Market Risk: High | Impaired Model. Turnaround. Shopping experience irrelevant. Sharply eroding margins & rising costs. Inferior merchandising, high competition, channel disintermediation. Operating Risk: High | Sinkhole-Busted Supply Chain Recapitalization can't stem profit erosion. Supply chain inefficient. Requires new management & strategic model. Accounting issues. Event Risk: High | Sinkhole-Illiquid. High-yield credit. Negative leverage, capital returns and rental coverage. High level of asset sales & store closings. Credit Risk: High | Turnaround Assets/ Non-integral to Business. High functional obsolescence, disintermediation & real estate dislocation. Deferred cap ex & poor locations lower residual value. Asset Risk: High | | | | | | |
| Negative 10.00 & Beyond | Growth Starved. Zero prospects outside of corp sale Downsizing store portfolio. Market Risk: Extreme | Model BrokenBeyond Repair. Zero going-concern value. Channel disintermediation. Operating Risk: Extreme | Distressed-Liquidation. Bankruptcy specter & mgmt turnover. Inefficient supply chain. Event Risk: High | Insolvent. Value in breakup of company & assets. Negative rental cvg. Credit Risk: High | Junk Assets. Marginal residual value. Channel dislocation & disintermediation. Asset Risk: High | | | | | | |